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An Optional Simplified Income Tax?
BORIS I. BITTKER
ASSERTING that a study of high-income individual income tax
returns proves that "some taxpayers do not pay nearly enough;
others pay too much," and urging that " [i] t is time we began to
reduce the premium enjoyed by the taxpayer who has tax lawyers
and accountants to show him ways to avoid paying taxes to his
federal government," Senator Russell B. Long proposed an op-
tional "Simplified Tax Method" in October of 1963 as an amend-
ment to the administration's pending revenue bill (H.R. 8363,
which became the Revenue Act of 1964). Modified and elaborated
in the light of Treasury studies, the proposal was introduced again
by Senator Long in 1964 "so that it may be studied fully" by Con-
gress, the Treasury, and the public.1 No action has been taken on
the bill as yet, but Senator Long announced that he would "seek
action onit" during the 89th Congress.
Under the Long proposal, the individual taxpayer may elect to
compute his federal income tax on a newly-defined base, so-called
"simplified taxable income"-roughly speaking, adjusted gross
income as defined by section 62 of the 1954 Code, enlarged by add-
ing back certain items that are now excluded or deducted from gross
income in arriving at adjusted gross income (e.g., tax-exempt in-
terest; contributions to qualified employee and self-employed
pension plans; intangible drilling and development costs; state,
local, and foreign. income taxes; percentage depletion; employee
1 The 1963 proposal was described by Senaror Long in II. Senate speech on October 16,
1963, 109 CONGo REO. 19706 (1963). It was referred to tho Senate Financo Committee,
which "tentatively approved the Amendment by a vote of 9-5, with tho understaniliDg
that the provision is still subject to amendment." Press Releaso NO.2, Senate Financo
Committee, December 13, 1963.
The 1964 proposal (S. 3250, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.), which is printed as an appendix
to this article (infra at 37), was described by Senator Long in II. Senate speech on Octo-
ber 2, 1964, 110 CoNG. REo. 23087-23098 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1964).
Unless otherwise stated, references in the text are to the 1964 version. Comments at·
tributed to Senator Long come from both his 1963 and 1964 remarks; to avoid peppering
the text with distracting footnotes, I have not cited the pages in each instance, but the
speeches are brief and the sources can. be ensi1y found. Tho context indicates, when rele-
vant, whether the comment was made in 1963 or in 1964-
1
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death benefits and sick pay; and the fifty per cent deduction for
long-term capital gains).
In return for accepting this expanded tax base, and for renounc-
ing all personal deductions (except for alimony payments), all
dependency exemptions, and the credits for retirement income and
partially tax-exempt interest, the taxpayer gets the benefit of a
new rate schedule, ranging from 20 to 40 per cent on the first
$50,000 (single persons) or $100,000 (joint returns) of" simplified
taxable income" and rising to a maximum of 50 per cent on the
excess above these amounts.2 The simplified tax method is optional
with the taxpayer, but an election is to be binding for five taxable
years, unless revoked or terminated sooner on the occurrence of
certain events, of which the most important is a change in the In-
ternal Revenue Code or Regulations that eliminates, in the opinion
of the Treasury, "a major portion of the difference" between the
tax liability of electing taxpayers as a class under the simplified
method and their tax liability under regular (i.e., non-" simpli-
fied") law.
Moreover, the taxpayer may revoke the election at any time hI?
chooses, in which event his tax liability for all prior years covered
by the revoked election will be re-computed (based on regular rates),
an additional tax of five per cent of the re-computed tax liability
will be added, and the taxpayer will either pay the excess of this
amount over the taxes previously paid by him under the "sim-
plified" method or receive a refund. On the expiration of an elec-
tion at the end of its normal five-year life, it may be renewed; but if
the taxpayer terminates, revokes, or fails to renew his election,
he may not return to the simplified tax method for five years unless
the Treasury consents.
On introducing the simplified tax method in its original form in
1963, Senator Long said that the Treasury had estimated that it
would be elected by about 12,000 taxpayers with adjusted gross
income of $50,000 or more and by about 2,000 with adjusted gross
income below $50,000, at an aggregate revenue loss of about $45
million. In announcing these 1963 estimates (based on proposed
rates of 40 per cent for the first $50,000 or $100,000 of simplified
taxable income and 50 per cent above these amounts), Senator
2 Infra at 40. In states with a federally-based state income ta."C, the elceting tnxpayer
will suffer a partially offsetting increase in his state tax burden unless he is allowod to
compute "taxable income" for state purposes as he would have computed it sans an
election.
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Long held out the hope of a later extension of the method to benefit
more taxpayers in the $10,000 to $50,000 bracket, but said that:
In the experimental stage this would not be practical because errors in
estimates which cannot be foreseen at present could cost this nation several
billions of dollars of revenue.3
In 1964, however, the proposal was amended to broaden its appeal,
primarily by a reduction of rates to the 20-50 per cent schedule
described above. With these changes, the simplified method would
be elected by 313,000 taxpayers, according to Treasury estimates
cited by Senator Long, at a revenue cost of $225 million.of
On introducing the 1964 version, Senator Long said that former
Secretary Douglas Dillon, Assistant Secretary Stanley Surrey,
and others in the Treasury had displayed "a great amount of
enthusiasm for this type of tax reform," and that former Com-
missioner Mortimer Caplin called it "the most hopeful thing he
had seen in some time for bringing about fair, equitable, uniform
tax treatment for all American taypayers. " The plan has also been
warmly received by several members of the Senate Finance Com-
mittee, and in 1963 it was "tentatively approved" by the Commit-
tee itself. Even though these endorsements may have been intended
more as encouragement than commitment, they attest to the allure
of "simplification" and at the same time suggest that the implica-
tions of the proposal be carefully studied. I offer here my OWll-
far from comprehensive-comments as a first step toward a more
thorough public examination of the issues}:;
3109 CONGo REO. 19706 (1963). Senator Long may ha-ro been cautious bC'causo of his
disillusioning experience with qu:ilified st{)ek options, which "pro'l"ed to be a much
greater loophole than I, as a Member of the Senate at that time-not as n member of
the committee-dreamed it would be." ld. at 19712.
4 The Treasury estimates quoted by Sennt{)r Long gi-ro the nUDlber of elC'Cting tax-
payers by adjusted gross income class and the re-renue loss as follows:
Tn:mble returns
AGIclass (present law) Number elC'CUng Re'l"enue loss
(thousands) (thousands) (thousands) (millions)
$10-20 6,709 10 •




$100 and o-rer 8 fiG
7,903 313 $225
if Under $2.5 million.
5 The 1964 -rersion differs from the 1963 -rersion in proposing an increase in tho mini-
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SUMMARY OF THE PROPOSAL
First, a description of the proposal, which takes the form of a
new" Subchapter U-Election of Simplified Tax Method," to be
added to Chapter 1 of Subtitle A (Income Taxes) of the 1954 Code.
Its principal features are: (1) a definition of "simplified taxable
income"; (2) a special rate schedule; (3) rules for making, revok-
ing, and terminating the election; and (4) special rules to prevent
tax avoidance.
"SIMPLIFIED TAXABLE INCOME"
The base on which the simplified tax is to be imposed is "sim-
plified taxable income." This concept, to be found in section
1393(a) of the proposal, builds on adjusted gross income as de-
fined by section 62 of the 1954 Code, but makes the following modi-
fications :
Additions to adjusted gross income. Adjusted gross income is
enlarged by adding back most of the items that are specifically
excluded from gross income by sections 101-119, including em-
ployee death benefits, tax-exempt bond interest, compensation for
injuries or sickness, sick pay and other employer-financed accident
and health benefits, dividends excludible under section 116, scholar-
ships and fellowships, and a number of more minor items that are
now excluded by statute from gross income. Not all of the exclu-
sions granted by sections 101-119 are nullified; section 101(a) and
(d) (proceeds of life insurance), section 102 (gifts and inherit-
ances), section 108 (elective exclusion of income from discharge of
indebtedness), and section 111 (recovery of bad debts, prior taxes,
and delinquency amounts) remain intact.
The electing taxpayer must also include in "simplified taxable
income" 'all foreign source income now excludable under section
911 (income for services during bona fide foreign residence or 17-
out-of-18 month physical presence abroad), section 894 (income
exempt by treaty), section 912 (government allowances for for-
eign service), section 931 (income from possessions of United
States), section 893 (compensation of alien employees of foreign
governments and international organizations), and section 943
(China Trade Act dividends).
mum standard deduction of $100 ($50 for married persons :filing separate returns), and
an increase in the ceiling on the standard deduction from $1,000 (existing law) to
$2,000. These changes, though proposed "to make simplification available to ••• low-
income taxpayers," do not require the taxpa.yer to elect the simplifiod tn.'!: method, and
are so clearly separable from that method as not to require discussion here.
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Finally, "simplified taxable income" is to include government
unemployment benefits, as well as a variety of items constituting
compensation for the taxpayer's services: two-thirds of pensions
andlor annuities under the Social Security and Railroad Retire-
ment Acts (the untaxed one-third being treated as a return of the
employee's contributions), employer contributions to pension and
profit-sharing plans if the taxpayer's rights are non-forfeitable,
employer-financed group term life insurance premiums, and the
" spread" between the cost and the fair market value of stock
acquired under qualified or restricted stock options or employee
stock purchase plans.
Denial of deductions. Adjusted gross income is to be increased
under the Long proposal not only by denying the statutory ex-
clusions listed above, but also by denying certain deductions now
allowed in converting gross income to adjusted gross income. The
deductions to be denied, under section 1393(c) of the proposal,
are: state, local, and foreign income taxes (sections 162, 164, and
212) ; 6 the deduction of fifty per cent of the excess of net long-term
capital gain over net short-term capital loss (section 1202) ; contri-
butions to self-employed pension plans (sections 404-405); per-
centage depletion (since cost depletion remains an allowable de-
duction, the net effect is to disallow the excess of percentage over
cost depletion); intangible drilling and development costs for oil
and gas wells (section 263(c) ) ; exploration and development ex-
penditures for other natural resources (sections 615-616); cir-
culation expenditures (section 173); and certain agricultural ex-
penditures (sections 175, 180, and 182).
Additional deductions. Under existing law, most expenses which
are deductible under section 162 and some of those deductible un-
der section 212 are deducted from gross income in reaching ad-
justed gross income. Section 1393(d) of the proposal would depart
from existing law by allowing all section 212 expenses to be de-
ducted, as well as those section 162 expenses of an employee that
are not listed in section 62(2) and hence are not now deductible by
a taxpayer using the optional standard deduction. In addition,
expenses that would be deductible under section 162 and section
6 The disallowance of state, local, and foreign tlutes "on or measured by net income"
is evidently based on the theory that they constitute a cost of living rather than of doing
business even if levied on bnsiness income. No attempt is made, however, to d.isallow
functionally equivalent taxes, although section 903 (foreign tlut credit for tlutcs paid
"in lieu of" a tax on income) attests to their existence. Although foreign income taxes
cannot be deducted by the electing tmtpayer, he can apply them nB 0. credit-if I re3d the
proposal correctly.
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212 except for the fact that they are allocable to exempt income
will be deductible by the electing taxpayer if the items to which
they are allocable lose their exempt status. An example is interest
paid on indebtedness to purchase tax-exempt bonds; the interest
received being taxable to the electing taxpayer, the interest paid
by him. will become deductible.
Personal deductions and exemptions. In computing "simplified
taxable income," the general rule is that neither the personal de-
ductions of existing law nor the optional standard deduction are
to be allowed. An exception is made for alimony payments, which
will continue to be deductible, and for a few more minor items
described below.7 The basic personal exemptions of $600 each fo1'
the taxpayer and his wife are allowed in computing "simplified
taxable income," but not the additional exemptions for age and
blindness or for dependents.
COMPUTATION OF THE "SThIPLIFIED TAX"
"Simplified taxable income" (viz., adjusted gross income, modi-
fied as described above) is the base to which the new tax rates are
applied. The 1963 version imposed a "simplified tax" of 40 per
cent of the first $50,000, $75,000, or $100,000 of "simplified taxable
income" (depending on whether the taxpayer filed a separate,
head-of-household, or joint return), plus 50 per cent of the excess.
For taxpayers reporting an excess of net long-term capital gain
over net short-term capital loss, however, the 25 per cent alterna-
tive tax was preserved.s The 1964 version abandons the 1963 con-
cept of a nearly flat rate in favor of graduation by steps from 20
per cent to 50 per cent, in order to expand the circle of electing
taxpayers beyond the "handfull of high-income taxpayers" who
were viewed by Senator Long as the principal beneficiaries of the
1963 proposal. Along with this change, however, came an elimina-
tion of the special treatment of long-term capital gains, which are
to be taxed in the same manner as other income. (Section 1211 (b) 's
restriction on the deductibility of capital losses is retained, how-
ever, along with the capital loss carryover of section 1212(b).)
The rate schedules proposed by the 1964 version for single
persons and for married persons filing jointly are:
.. Infra at 16.
8 Since the 1963 proposal was geared to R.R. 8363 (the revenue bill of 1963), it made
use of the proposed (but unenacted) reclassification of capital gains into class A capitnl
gain, class B capital gain, and short-term capital gain.
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20% of the :first
25% of amounts between
30% of amounts between
35% of amounts between
40% of amounts between















As under existing law, married persons :filing separate returns
would be subject to the single persons schedule, while surviving
spouses would pay at the joint return rate. Heads of households
would be subject to rates intermediate between those in the table
above.
If an electing taxpayer so desires, the income averaging pro-
visions of sections 1301-1305 will apply in computing the simpli-
fied tax, but his "average base period income" will take into ac-
count only those years for which a simplified tax election was in
effect. On the termination, expiration, or revocation of an election,
election years may not be averaged with non-election years, and
the taxpayer will not be eligible for averaging for a period of four
years unless he consents to such regulations as the Treasury' 'may
deem necessary to carry out the purposes of this section."
Finally, in computing his ultimate tax liability, the electing tax-
payer is denied the credits provided by section 35 (partially tax-
exempt interest) and section 37 (retirement income).
THE FIVE-YEAR ELECTION AND ITS EXPIRATION, TERMINATION, AND
REVOCATION
A taxpayer choosing the simplified tax for any taxable
year must make his election within the time prescribed for
filing the income tax return. The election is effective for that year
and the four succeeding taxable years unless revoked or terminated.
Before making an election, therefore, the taxpayer may review the
financial results of the first year to which it will apply. Upon the
expiration of an election at the end of its normal five year period,
the taxpayer may renew it and thus enter upon another five-year
cycle. If he fails to renew his election promptly, however, or if it
terminates or is revoked for any reason, he may not make a new
election for five years, except with the Treasury's consent.
The election's five-year life and the five-year "waiting period"
for the taxpayer who fails to keep his election continuously in
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force (which are reminiscent of, but not identical with, the con-
ditions imposed on electing taxpayers by Subchapter S and the
consolidated return regulations) are intended by Senator Long as
safeguards against manipulation:
If the election could be changed every year without penalty, it could be
abused by taxpayers electing in alternate years and bunching their deduc-
tions, tax-exempt interest, and so forth, in years when they do not elect.
Thus, they would get the benefit both of the present tax system with its
provisions favoring certain types of income and expenditures and the op-
tional method with its low, effective rates. On the other hand, if the election
were made effective for all time or for a very long period of time, very few
taxpayers would elect because they would be unwilling to commit them-
selves for so long into the future when their circumstances might very well
change. A 5-year election, however, should be long enough to prevent manip-
ulation and yet short enough so that at least some taxpayers would be willing
to commit themselves to get the benefit of favorable rates.
Even before an election's expiration at the end of its normal
five-year life, however, it may terminate, be revoked prospectively,
or (on payment of a moderate additional tax) be revoked retro-
actively:
Termination. A married taxpayer is permitted by section 1391
(a) (3) to elect only if his spouse makes, or has made, an election,
and his election will terminate under section 1391(b) whenever an
election is not in effect for his spouse. Thus, a termination will
occur if (1) an electing taxpayer becomes married during his 5-year
period to a spouse who has not, and does not, make an election;
(2) if an election made by his spouse before their marriage ex-
pires during his five-year period and is not renewed; or (3) if
his wife's election is revoked in one of the ways to be described
herein. A divorce, however, does not terminate the election for
either spouse.
Prospective revocation. A prospective revocation of an election
terminates it under section 1391(c) for the current year and for the
remaining years of its five-year period, but does not affect prior
election years. A revocation of this type is optional with an electing
taxpayer under section 1391(d) if he is discharged in bankruptoy;
if he becomes disabled within the meaning of section 213(g)(3)
(inability to engage in gainful activity by reason of permanent
physical or mental impairment) and at least fifty per cent of his
gross income for the prior five years consisted of earned income;
or if the Code or regulations are amended after his election so as to
eliminate a "major portion" of the tax advantage of electing tax-
payers "as a class."
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Supervening physical or mental disability of a permanent char-
acter is presumably made a ground for revocation on the theory
that it would be unfair to compel the taxpayer, who may have
elected in order to get the benefit of the simplified tax rates for
earned income, to forego the medical expense deduction and to
report damages for personal injury or post-disability investment
income (e.g., capital gains or tax-exempt interest) as "simplified
taxable income." A bankruptcy discharge may similarly presage
a substantial change in the taxpayer's financial status; if he were
held to his election until its normal expiration, he would be subject
to a minimum tax rate of twenty per cent no matter how modest
his earnings, computed without the benefit of personal deductions
or dependency exemptions.
More important than either of these grounds for revoking the
election is a change in the Code or regulations that, in the view of
the Treasury, eliminates "a major portion of the difference" be-
tween the simplified tax liability of electing taxpayers" as a class"
and their regular (i.e., non-" simplified") tax liability. The most ob-
vious event of this character would be a change in the tax rates
(either a decrease in the normal rates, or an increase in the simpli-
fied rates) that substantially narrowed the gap between the two
tax systems. Structural changes that could have the specified ef-
fect are: an expansion of the definition of capital gains or a reduc-
tion of the long-term. holding period; new personal deductions, or a
removal of the limits on existing deductions; more liberal depend-
ency exemptions, either in coverage or dollar amount; a substantial
increase in the ceiling on the optional standard deduction; changes
in the averaging provisions of sections 1301-1305; etc. If the im-
pact of a statutory change is debatable, the Treasury will obviously
be pressed to resolve its doubts in favor of an amnesty; and when-
ever an amendment to the regulations is arguably disadvantageous
to electing taxpayers, the Treasury will surely be charged with
highhandedness if it refuses to permit them to renounce their
elections.9
9 Because a disadvantageous amendment to the regulntions would permit electing tax·
payers to revoke their elections, the Treasury would find itself in an exquisite dilemmn
every time a loophole in the simplified tax regulntions was discovered: should it close
the loophole at the cost of opening the main gate, or 1en:vo the loophole open in ordar to
keep the main gate closed7 A cautious Treasury staff, foreseeing this difficulty, emmot
avoid it by refraining from issuing regulntions until accumulated experience ennblcs it
to be right the first time. This is because the proposnl provides that elections for taxable
years ending before the "tax avoidance" regulntions (infra at 38) nrc issued need not
be made until ninety days after that date.
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The terms "major portion of the difference" and "electing tax-
payers as a class" are sufficiently vague to make a prediction
perilous, but some light on the probable frequency of "major
change" amnesties may be shed by our experience with an analogous
provision in the consolidated returns regulations. Under Treasury
Regulations section 1.1502-11(a), permitting an affiliated group
of corporations to terminate its election to file consolidated tax
returns whenever the Code or consolidated return regulations are
amended so as to make such returns "substantially less advan-
tageous to affiliated groups as a class," 10 taxpayers were allowed
to terminate their elections on enactment of the 1954 Code, the
Technical Changes Act of 1958, and the Revenue Acts of 1962
and 1964; and amnesties were declared under the somewhat more
liberal rules prevailing before the 1954 Code for calendar year
taxpayers in 1941, 1943, 1944, 1946, 1947, 1948, 1950, and 1952.11
There being more for Congress to tinker with in the individual in-
come tax area, I would expect "major change" amnesties to be
declared even more frequently under the simplified tax method.
Unless we encounter an unprecedented series of "do nothing"
Congresses, then, taxpayers are not likely to be frozen into the sim-
plified tax system for more than two or three years at a spell,
despite the election's theoretical five-year life.
Retroaction revocative. Responding to complaints that the elec-
tion rules of his 1963 proposal were "too harsh, particularly in
cases where the taxpayer has suffered unexpected financial ro-
verses," Senator Long's 1964 version includes a provision for a
retroactive revocation, exercisable by the taxpayer at any time he
desires. Such a revocation wipes out the election ab initio, requiring
a recomputation of the taxpayer's taxable income and tax liability
under the normal rules applicable to non-electing taxpayers. Tho
recomputed tax liability is increased by 5 per cent,12 and tho
difference between this amount and the amount actually paid by tho
taxpayer is either assessed as a deficiency, or refunded, with in-
terest,13
10 The 1963 version of the simplified tax proposal used tho snme language as Reg~.
§ 1.1502-11(a) (1955). I nm not sure whether the somewhat different 1964 pbras~ology
was intended to preserve, liberalize, or restriet tho seope of the 1963 provision.
11 PEEL, CoNSOLIDATED TAX RETURNS § 7.06 (1959).
12 The 5% additional tax is based on the reeomputed tax for the year in question.
Beeause it takes no aeeount of the differenee between the simplifie(l and "normal" tax
liabilities, a taxpayer who saved very little by eleeting must pay the same additional tax
for revoking his eleetion as the taxpayer whose saving was Bubstantial. Interest, bow-
ever, is based on the defieieney alone.
13 A defieieney may be assessed or a elaim for refund :filed II notwitllstanding any law
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
HeinOnline -- 21 Tax L. Rev. 11 1965-1966
1965] OPTIONAL SIMPLIFIED INCo:r.m TAX 11
As will be seen/sa although the provision for retroactive revoca-
tion of the election was designed to aid taxpayers suffering' 'unex-
pected financial reverses," it will be of much less value to them
than to taxpayers enjoying unexpected financial windfalls.
SPECIAL ANTI-AvOIDANCE R.EGULATIONS
The proposal, in language taken from section 1502 (consolidated
returns), empowers the Treasury to issue regulations for determin-
ing and adjusting the tax liability of an electing taxpayer "in such
manner as clearly to reflect the income tax liability of such taxpayer
and the various factors necessary for the determination of such
liability, and in order to prevent avoidance of such tax liability."
The regulations may provide for the distribution, apportionment,
or allocation of gross income, exclusions, deductions, and other
relevant items between the electing taxpayer and "any other
person or persons." Finally, the simplified tax regulations, like
those governing consolidated returns, are to apply not only to the
elective period, but also-without any explicit time limit-to tax-
able years before and after this period. The statute of limitations
is extended so that a deficiency" attributable" to the regulations
may be assessed at any time until the statute has run on the last
taxable year for which the election is in effect.
In thus bestowing jurisdiction on the Treasury over non-election
years and non-electing taxpayers, the anti-avoidance provision is
presumably aimed at "cake-eating" plans to shift income, deduc-
tions, and other items from election years to non-election years and
from electing taxpayers to related non-electing taxpayers (and vice
versa), in order to get the benefits of the simplified tax system with-
out its burdens.H By authorizing the Treasury to issue regulations
of such unprecedented breadth, the draftsmen of the proposal be-
tray an unmistakable (though no doubt grudging) respect for the
ingenuity that creates the" gimmicks" and "schemes" which Sena-
tor Long hopes to eliminate by the simplified tax method itself. At
the same time, they come close to confessing that the tax-avoidance
or rule of law." In addition to waiving the statute of limitations, this presumably waivcs
the doctrine of res judicata, and thus permits a tm:paper whose simplificd tax liability
is judieially determined t~ be greater than reported (c.g., because his gain on an excll!lDgo
of stock did not qualify for non-recognition) t~ revoke his election niter losing the law-
suit and re-compute his liability under the normnl tax method.
13a Infra, at 26.
HAs will be seen (infra at 22), special rules are also prescribed. to forestnll tlic use
of trusts to shift various items of income and deduction t~ non-clecting ye:trs or non·
electing taxpayers.
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potential of the simplified tax method is so great that the legislative
process cannot prescribe rules to control it, and must transfer
the task to the Treasury.
For reasons that are set out later, I think that the draftsmen have
properly assessed the dangers, but that they have satisfied them-
selves too readily that Treasury regulations will be an effective, or
desirable, remedy.
THE NEW TAX BASE: "SIMPLIFIED TAXABLE INCOME"
In analysing Senator Long's proposal, I turn first to its central
idea and primary structural reform-the formulation of a new tax
base ("simplified taxable income") to be taxed at lower rates, so
that "upper income taxpayers [may] avail themselves of a rela-
tively simple tax system under which all income is treated alike
and there are no complicated personal deductions." This aim has
been espoused for some time by students of federal income taxation,
and on recently emerging from the shelter of Academe, it has
gained some support from the American Bar AssociationY' Disre-
garding for the moment the optional feature of Senator Long's
proposal, which was absent from its predecessors, how well does
it achieve this aim of "a relatively simple tax system" in which" all
income is treated alike" ~ 16
The first step in answering this question is to note that the pro-
posal expands the tax base primarily by nullifying some (not all)
of the statutory exclusions of sections 101-119 and by including
certain benefits deriving from the taxpayer's personal services:
foreign source income earned abroad; social security, railroad
retirement, and unemployment benefits; pension and profit-sharing
trusts; qualified stock options; and group-term life insurance pre-
miums paid by the employer.
15 See Peehman, Erosion of the IndividuaZ Income Ta:c, 10 NAT'L. TAX J. 1 (1057), and
articles cited in note 1 thereof; Blum, FederaZ Income Ta:c Reform-Twenty Questions,
41 TAXES 672 (1963); Galvin, Progress in Substantive TalC Reform; Work of tho Ameri-
can Bar Association; Treasury Studies; What Ta:c Praotitioners Oan do, 1965 So. CALIi'.
TAX INST. 1; A.B.A. SECTION OF TAXATION; REPORT TO HOUSE OF DELEGATES ON Sun-
STANTIVE TAX REFORM (Feb. 1965).
16 In examining this question, I am accepting for the moment the Long proposlll'o
premise that a tax system in which "all income is treated alike" would be moro oqui-
table than existing law. In point of fact, I am very skepticlll of this premise, nnd hope
to show in a forthcoming article that no income tax base, no matter how IIcomprehen-
sive," can be "neutral" or devoid of "preferences," and that the "comprehensive"
tax bases that have been offered to us so far as substitutes for II taxable incomo" as
now defined have not ventured even ankle·deep into the treacherous waters of "neu-
trality."
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Once we go beyond the statutory exclusions of sections 101-119,
however, we :find a number of other candidates for inclusion in a
tax base that seeks to "treat all income alike." Three of the most
obvious are the net imputed rent of owner-occupied homes, the in-
terest earned on life insurance reserves (reflected in the increase
in cash surrender value), and the accrued appreciation in assets
transferred by gift or at death. Their omission is evidently not to
be explained by the taxpayer's possible shortage of cash to pay
the tax; the Long proposal requires many other items to be included
in the tax base though not received in, or easily converted to, cash
(contributions to pension and profit-sharing plans, a lessee's im-
provements to the lessor's property, group-term life insurance
premiums, etc.) . .Almost all advocates of a "comprehensive" tax
base have called attention to the omission of imputed rent, life in-
surance interest, and accrued appreciation at death from gross
income as now de:fined, and it is surprising to :find that Senator
Long's proposal leaves these areas untouched.
Equally surprising is the proposal's placid acceptance of the
Code's numerous non-recognition provisions, which afford shelter
to many items that could be included in a comprehensive tax base.
r refer to the non-recognition of gain (and sometimes of loss) on
exchanges in mergers and other corporate reorganizations, split-
offs, exchanges of "like kind" properties, dispositions of personal
residences and condemned property if replaced by the taxpayer,
and flO onP Although the taxpayer's economic circumstances are
not always radically changed by such exchanges, they often are;
and he sometimes comes out of the exchange with readily market-
able property. To be sure, these provisions are commonly regarded
as postponing the recognition of gain, rather than excluding it
permanently, but postponement in itself is a "special provision"
favoring a restricted class of income, and in fact it frequently
results in a full-scale exclusion (e.g., when the assets are held until
death). In any event, the non-recognition provisions share both of
these characteristics with some of the exclusions that Senator
17 The 1963 version authorized the Treasury to issue regulations prescribing the extent
t.o which § 721 (nonrecognition of gain or loss on contribution to a partnership), § 1031
(exchanges of "like kind" property), § 1036 (exchanges of stoek for stoclt of =0
corporation), as well as all the provisions of Subchnptcr 0, would npply to trnnsfors
during the election period or the two years immediately preceding or following. As will
be seen, the Treasury's power to issue regulations under tho 19t34: proposal may include
some authority over these transactions, but presumnbly this power is re.strickd to ex-
changes motivated by tax avoidance; it can hnrdly hnve been intended to nullify tho
normal functioning of the statutory non-recognition provisions.
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Long's proposal proposes to eliminate (e.g., lessee-constructed
improvements under section 109), and they rank high in any real-
istic ranking of complicated statutory provisions that enable the
rich to grow richer without tax cost.
Despite this fact, Congress had quite valid reasons for enacting
most if not all of these nonrecognition provisions, but its reasons
for enacting many of the exclusions that Senator Long proposes to
abolish were equally compelling. If an investor can postpone the
recognition of gain, even though it is realized on a corporate
merger, why should an employee be forbidden to postpone the rec-
ognition of earnings fed into a pension or profit-sharing plan, or a
lessor be forbidden to postpone income resulting from his lessee's
improvements7
These are not the only inconsistencies in the simplified tax
method's approach to the postponement of income. By accepting
without qualification the accounting methods of existing law, it
preserves the right to postpone the recognition of realized income
through use of the installment and LIFO method of accounting.18
Here again, there is a striking difference between the proposal's
rejection of the postponement of earned income through the use of
qualified pension and profit-sharing plans and its tolerance of post-
ponement in other areas. Senator Long may have persuasive rea-
sons for these distinctions; but whatever they turn out to be,
they will assuredly be inconsistent with the claim of a "simpli-
fied" tax base in which "all income is treated alike."
There are many other puzzling, debatable, or fine distinctions
between items that must be included in "simplified taxable income"
and items whose exclusion under existing law is preserved. Among
these distinctions are the following:
scholarships and fellowships become taxable, but prizes for
notable achievement under section 74(a) remain exempt;
unemployment benefits become taxable, but strike benefits
remain exempt if constituting gifts under section 102;
employee death benefits and damages for personal injury and
sickness become taxable, but not compensation for wrongful
death, life insurance proceeds, or gifts and inheritances;
scholarships and military mustering-out pay become taxable,
but not "G.T. benefits" payable to veterans;
workmen's compensation payments and damages for personal
injury become taxable, but not compensation, pensions, or
18 See also note 36 infra.
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other benefits received by veterans for either service or non-
service connected disability;
distributions of stock to comply with a federal anti-trust order
are denied the benefit of section 1111, but distributions to
comply with orders of the F.e.e., S.E.e. or Federal Reserve
Board continue to qualify for favorable treatment under sec-
tion 1071, sections 1081-1083, and sections 1101-1103;
income from improvements constructed by a lessee on the
lessor's property (section 109) becomes taxable, but income
from discharge of indebtedness continues to be excludible
if applied to reduce the basis of the taxpayer's property (sec-
tion 108); and
contributions to pension and profit-sharing plans become tax-
able to the employee, but not deferred compensation of the
type described in Revenue Ruling 60-31.10
Turning to the area of business deductions, we find another
seri~ of decisions that rest on no consistent policy judgments, or
at least none that I can detect. The disallowance of percentage de-
pletion and natural resource development expenses seems to reject
the "incentive" function of income taxation in order to achieve
a "purified" tax base and prevent the taxpayer from deducting
more than his investment over the life of an asset. But why does
the proposal preserve the investment credit, which also serves an
incentive purpose and, taken in conjunction with depreciation,
similarly inflates the allowance for investment? (It is not that
credits are uniformly preserved by the proposal; the retirement
income credit is eliminated.) Similarly Janus-faced is the pro-
posal's treatment of the thicket of provisions for the deductions
or rapid amortization of capital outlays. It bravely disallows de-
ductions under section 173 (circulation expenditures), section 175
(soil and water conservation expenditures), section 180 (ferti-
lizer), and section 182 (clearing farm land), thus restoring the
"correct" treatment of these items (viz., as capital outlays); but
it preserves the deductions allowed by section 169 (grain-storage
facilities), section 174 (research and experimental expenditures),
section 177 (trademark and trade name expenditures), and section
179 (additional first-year depreciation for small business). (At
the risk of interrupting my recital of inconsistencies, I must ad-
mit here that a senator who takes on the oil and gas, newspaper,
and farm lobbies all at once deserves a Silver Star, and will prob-
ably get a Purple Heart as well.)
"91960-1 Clm. BULL. 174.
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Just as the twin objectives of "simplification" and "equity"
leave many questions unanswered in the treatment of exclusions
and business deductions, they also leave room for judgment in
deciding which personal deductions shall be allowed and which
denied. The keynote of the simplified tax system, in both its 1963
and 1964 versions, is the elimination of personal deductions, but
between 1963 and 1964, Senator Long relented enough to restore
the deduction for alimony. Since he had promised in 1963 "to
resist with all of my courage and ability any effort to make this
[simplified tax] system the subject of loopholes for the benefit
of favored taxpayers," we must assume that the deduction for
alimony payments is not a "loophole." I agree, but I would not
:find it easy to defend a deduction for alimony while opposing
exemptions for minor children and other dependents; nor am I
sure that the deduction for alimony is any more plausible than a
deduction for extraordinary casualty losses or medical expenses.20
For this reason, I have no confidence whatsoever that a simplified
tax system with a deduction for alimony would not soon be
amended to provide allowances for these other costs of living.
In point of fact, alimony is not the simplified tax system's only
personal deduction to create disparities and hence to invite the
restoration of still other deductions. Bad debt losses are allowed
even though the loan was an accommodation to a relative or friend,
unconnected with the taxpayer's business or profit-oriented activ-
ities. If an electing taxpayer lends his car to a friend, and it is
wrecked, the casualty loss is not deductible in computing simplified
taxable income, but if a sum of money is lent in the same spirit of
friendship, and the debt is not repaid, the loss is deductible. If
anything, I would argue for precisely the opposite results; the
casualty loss is almost certainly unexpected, while the friend's
inability to repay the loan may have been foreshadowed but dis-
regarded out of generosity, and the taxpayer is not likely to ex-
haust a normal creditor's remedies to collect such a debpt In
20 To be sure, the ex-wife must report any amount deducte<l by her husband; but if
the net effect is to reduce the aggregate tax burden on tho individuals concerned (as it
almost always is), the alimony deduction differs from the other personal deductions in
a technical sense only. Moreover, if parents were allowed to deduct tho cost of support.
ing their children on condition that any deducted amounts be included in tho child's
gross income, we would have a nearly-perfect parallel to the alimony deduction. If the
latter is acceptable, why not the former'
21 The difficulty of proving that such a debt was intended as a gift from the outset,
or that the ta...~paper did not try hard enough to collect it, contributed to the enactment
of § 166(d), requiring uncollectible nonbusiness debts to be deducted as short-term
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response to these arguments, it may be said that taxpayers can
insure more easily against most (not all) casualty losses than
against bad debts, but this does not seem conclusive. Still less
does it prove that an allowance for uncollectable personal debts
should be preserved when other personal deductions are being jet-
tisoned.
A more minor point is the preservation of section 212(3), allow-
ing expenses incurred "in connection with the determination, col-
lection, or refund of any tax" to be deducted even though the
problem or dispute does not stem from the taxpayer's business or
profit-oriented activities. A deduction for the cost of litigating
one's federal tax liability has a "due process' , flavor, and might be
regarded as the rich taxpayer's equivalent of Powell 'lJ. Alabama
and later "right to counsel" cases.:!:! Under section 212(3), how-
ever, taxpayers have also been allowed to deduct the cost of plan-
ning tax-reduction arrangements,23 an allowance that conflicts with
Senator Long's goal of reducing "the premium enjoyed by the tax-
payer who has tax lawyers and accountants to show him ways to
avoid paying taxes to his Federal government. "
Income-splitting is another area of the law that ought to be
examined systematically in promulgating a comprehensive tax
base purporting to treat "all income alike." The proposal, re-
quires the electing taxpayer to include the income of certain h'usts
in his "simplified taxable income"; these provisions are discussed
elsewhere and need not be described again here.:!4 Although thl'
proposal thus acknowledges (albeit indirectly) that the income-
splitting rules of existing law are inconsistent with the aims of
capital losses. See Putnam v. C-ommissioner, 352 U.S. 82 (1956). This restTietion, how-
ever, does not offset the anamoly of 3ll0wing sueh debts, if not ineurred in n busineS3 or
profit-oriented context, to be deducted while other personnl deductions nrc dis.'lllowcd.
The electing taxpayer may apply nonbusiness bad debts agninst his capitnl gnins; indeed,
sinee the simplified system taxes capital gnins in full at the ordinary rate, the rigbt to
deduct nneollectible personal debts may be even more vnlunble, eompnrntivcly spenlting,
to the electing than to the non-electing tn.."qlnyer.
If the electing taxpayer is to be allowed to deduct bnd debts even though they nre
not business-connected because of the diffieulty of distinguishing behveen ttpersonnl"
loans and those that stem from n business or profit·making motive, wbnt is tho
rationale for disallowing a deduction for interest paid by the tn:qlnyer on ttpcrsonnl"
loans7 The distinction between personnl and profit-oriented transactions is difileult to
draw, whether the taxpayer is the borrower or the lender.
22 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); cf. Tellier v. Commissioner, 342 F.2d 090
(2d Ok. 1965).
23 Carpenter v. United States, 338 F.2d 366 (Ct. CL 1964) (Davis, J., dissenting)
(advice to minimize tax eonsequences of divorce settlement).
24 Infra at 20.
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the simplified tax method, it does not venture very far into this
well-stocked game preserve.
Turning from the details of "simplified taxable income" as
defined by the Long proposal, to an overall view of the concept,
one must acknowledge that it is an ambitious first step toward a
more comprehensive tax base.25 Many omissions remain, however,
so that a structure in which "all income is treated alike" is still
a long way off. In advocating' 'drastic broadening of the tax base"
along with" dramatic flattening of the rate scale," Professor Blum
has pointed out that his aims can be achieved only by "leaning
over backwards before allowing any [preferential provisions] to
remain in the law," because the retention of even a single prefer~
ence makes rate reduction less feasible, invites the charge of group-
favoritism, and encourages the retention or later restoration of
other exceptions.26 To these powerful arguments-which, in my
opinion, cannot be rebutted but will not be heeded-the elective
feature of Senator Long's proposal compels two more to be added.
First, the enactment of the simplified tax method would almost
certainly doom the hopes of those who favor a mandatory ex-
pansion of the tax base. To disarm those who fear that his pro-
posal would be the opening wedge to compulsion, Senator Long
has said:
I would like to emphasize that this method is optional and that taxpayers
could continue under the rates and other provisions [of existing law]....
There will be those who will fear that the alternative method of taxation
might eventually become the only system of taxation open to them. To t11080
persons, I can assure them that I would strenuously oppose any such effort.
Since the elimination of the "gimmicks" and "tax-avoidance
schemes" that are so eloquently criticized by Senator Long would
put non-electing taxpayers on a par with electing taxpayers, Sena-
tor Long seems to be saying that he disagrees with existing law
but will defend it to the death. Second, every omission from" sim-
plified taxable income" when the proposal is initially enacted will
have a claim to immortality. After taxpayers have made their
elections and adjusted their financial affairs to the new system,
they will unquestionably regard any attempt to expand the tax
base as a breach of faith, if the rules governing the revocation of
elections are not liberalized,27 and perhaps even if they are. If the
25 But see note 16 supra.
26 Blum, supra note 15, at 679.
27 Such liberalization could be accomplished, for example, by allowing rovocations OVOII
if electing taxpayers are not prejudiced "as a class," by waiving tho ponalty on a
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definition of "simplified taxable income" is to be truly compre-
hensive, therefore, it is now or never.
TEE STATUS OF RELATED, NON-ELECTING TAXPAYERS
Because Senator Long's simplified tax method applies only to
those individual taxpayers who choose to elect it, and does not
apply at all to corporations and trusts, it invites the shifting of
income and deductions from the electing taxpayer to non-electing
members of his family, and to his trusts and corporations. (An
elective system would have this effect even if the election com-
mitted the taxpayer to use the system for life, without possibility
of parole.) If an electing taxpayer engaged in the oil business or
in farming, for example, transfers these activities to (or has them
conducted from the outset by) a wholly-owned corporation, the
business income can be reduced by the allowances for percentage
depletion, intangible drilling and development costs, soil and
water conservation expenditures, etc. These deductions would be
denied if he operated as a proprietorship. :Moreover, the corpora-
tion will be able to deduct its state, local, and foreign income
taxes, although the electing taxpayer cannot. A corporate income
tax on the balance could then be eliminated by an election tmder
Subchapter S or minimized by the payment of a salary to the elect-
ing taxpayer for his personal services, and his tax on his salary
or Subchapter S income can then be computed at the favorable
"simplified" rates.
While he is about it, the individual taxpayer might as well allow
the corporation to contribute to any charities that he wishes to
aid, since contributions are deductible by it up to the five per cent
limit of section 170(b) (2) but would be "wasted" if made by him.
A wholly-owned corporation will also be useful to the electing tax-
payer who holds state and municipal bonds or appreciated secm"-
ities; if they are transferred to the corporation, the bond interest
will qualify for the exclusion of section 103 when received by the
corporation, and a gain on a corporate sale of the appreciated
securities will qualify for the favorable capital gain rate if a
Subchapter S election is not in effect. The reinvested proceeds will
be owned by the corporation, rather than by the taxpayer in his
own right, but this is not necessarily disadvantageous; he may hold
the stock of the corporation until death, transfer it by gift, bor-
row against it, or realize on it by a sale or liquidating distribution
retroactive l'evocation, and by shortening the waiting period before a new election ma)·
be made after revocation.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.D. Tax Law Review
HeinOnline -- 21 Tax L. Rev. 20 1965-1966
20 'l'AX LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:
when he has an offsetting capital loss or after his simplified tax
election has expired.
If the electing taxpayer does not wish to employ a corporation
as the vehicle for preserving the special allowances that he can-
not enjoy directly, he may be able to transfer some of these bene-
fits to a member of his family. By giving the farm or oil business
to a child, for example, he can keep the deductions for state in-
come taxes, percentage depletion, intangible drilling costs, and soil
and water conservation expenditures in the family, even though
he receives a salary as manager of the business and reports it at
the favorable simplified tax rates. For some taxpayers, the result-
ing reallocation of wealth within the family may not be appealing,
even if it merely anticipates the intended testamentary arrange-
ment; but for others, the tax saving will surely be irresistible.26
Finally, the trust, which has served so often to lighten or nullify
burdens imposed by the law on natural persons, is another medium
for perpetuating tax allowances despite an election under Senator
Long's proposal. The electing taxpayer who customarily makes
charitable contributions, for example, need not accept passively
the simplified tax method's disallowance of deductions; if he owns
income-producing property, he can transfer it to a ten-year trust 29
for charity and the income will not show upon his tax return even
though he will get back the corpus at the end of the ten-year period.
In the meantime, he can sprinkle the income around among chari-
table donees 'Selected at his pleasure, and the trust will pay no tax
because of its unlimited charitable deduction. Moreover, if he is
foresighted enough to create the trust before he elects to come
28 Many other intra-family transfers could be employed to preserve tax benefits that
in theory must be renounced by the electing ta:,payer, including: (a) a transfer of state
and municipal bonds to a member of the family, who can exclude the interest from lIis
gross income under § 103; (b) a gift (or a sale at the electing taxpayer's a(ljusted
basis) of appreciated securities to a member of the family, who can report his gain Oil
selling them at the favorable capital gain rate; (c) a transfer of the electing tnxpayor's
residence to a member of the family, who will pay and deduct tho roal property taxes
and mortgage interest but allow the taxpayer to occupy the premises rent·free; and (d)
a transfer of income-producing property to adult children or parents who would other-
wise be supported directly by the taxpayer, thus preserving, through tho medium of the
transferee's personal exemption and standard deduction, the substance (though not the
form) of the dependency exemption. In some cases, an election under the simplified tax
system would only strengthen pressures that now exist to make such transfers; but in
other cases, it would create a pressure where there now is none.
29 The trust must have a duration of at least ten years because the exception of § 673 (b)
for two-year charitable trusts is nullified by § 1394(b) (4) of the Long proposal. If the
income of a ten-year charitable trust is not to be attributed to grantor, however, I see
no valid reason for not allowing taxpayers to deduct, as existing law permits, straight.
forward contributions to charities.
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under the simplified tax method, and is willing to vest the rever-
sionary interest in his wife rather than himself, he may be en-
titled to a charitable deduction for the fair market value of the
anticipated income.30 Aside from its utility in preserving the chari-
table deduction (in substance, though not in form), a trust could
be used to operate a business and thus to benefit from the osten-
sibly unallowable deductions for percentage depletion, soil and
conservation expenditures, state income taxes, etc.31
Arrangements to shift income, deductions, and other allowances
from an electing taxpayer to related persons and entities who can
"use" them would, of course, have to run the gauntlet of the in-
come-splitting and similar rules, both statutory and judicially
created, of existing law. These rules would :filter out some devices
of an egregious character, but plenty of leeway would be left for
the taxpayer who refrained from crowding his luck. If n transfer
is tolerated for regular tax purposes, it might of course be argued
that it does not become objectionable merely because the taxpayer
has elected to be governed by the simplified tax method. Consist-
ently with his dissatisfaction with existing law, however, Senator
Long adopts the contrary view; and his proposal seeks to impose
additional restrictions on such arrangements, when employed by
electing taxpayers to preserve the special allowances of existing
law.
30 § 170(b) (1) (D) is intended to bar 3. deduction if the reversionary interest is Tested
in the grant<lr himself. (I say"intended," beenuse the language of Ule provision mny
fail to achieve its purpose; the lintitation comes into pIny if the grantor has n. 5% or
greater reversionary interest "in the corpus or income of that portion of the trust with
respect to which a deduetion would ••• be nJ]owable," and it is arguable that in tho trust
deseribed in the text, the deduetion relates to income while the reversionar.r interest
relates only to corpus.) Unless 3. reversionary interest in tho grantor's wife is treated as
an interest vested in the grantor (e.g., beenuse relieving him pro tanto of his obligation
to support her), the deduction is not barred by § 170(b) (1) (D) •
Whether the reversionary interest is Tested in the grantor or in someono elm, tho
deduetion might be attaeked on the ground that it is based on an income item that has
not been and will. not be ineluded in tho taxpayer's gross income, cl. Alsop "'.
Comm'T, 290 F.2d 726 (2d Cir. 1961); but this line of attaek seems Dot to havo been
explored, even by the commentat{)rs, perhaps beenuse § 170(b) (1) (D) is thought to
pre-empt the field. See Neuhoff, How to Mal:e Money by Giving It Away: Taz Con-
seque1We8 of CTeating a Cliaritable Trust, 23 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 105 (1961).
31 As I read the 1964 proposal, the trust would be entitled to the deductions described
in the text even if its net income is distributable (and tnxnble) to the grantor. (Tho
result would be substantially the same as incorporating tho busine.?S and mnking an
election under Subchapter S, supra at 19.) If the Treasury is anthorized by tho pro-
posal's tax-avoidance rules to promulgate regulations that would deny these deductions
to the trust when an eleeting taxpayer is its sole beneficiary, he could adjust his plans to
the rules with only a lintited loss of control by causing the trust to pay him n. snlnry for
his services and to distribute or aceumulnte the balance for members of his fantily.
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I have already mentioned section 1394(a) of the proposal, au-
thorizing the Treasury to prescribe regulations requiring an eleot-
ing taxpayer's return "clearly to reflect the income tax liability
of such taxpayer and the various factors necessary for the deter-
mination of such liability . . . in order to prevent avoidance of
such tax liability." 32 This is sweeping language, but I doubt that
a taxpayer's tax liability is inaccurately reported if his wholly-
owned corporation operates a farm or oil venture and claims de-
ductions for percentage depletion, intangible drilling costs, and
state income taxes, or if it sells appreciated securities formerly
owned by him and reports the profit as long-term capital gain. If
the property is transferred on the very eve of a sale or other trans-
action, of course, a readjustment would be appropriate, but in such
blatant circumstances, the Treasury's powers under existing law
would probably need little if any support from the proposed
new regulations. And if the case does not cry out so powerfully for
a readjustment (e.g., if the corporation owns the business or prop-
erty from its inception rather than acquiring it at the last minute,
or if the electing taxpayer is not the sole shareholder), I am even
more skeptical of the effectiveness of the proposed regulations.
In authorizing the promulgation of "anti-avoidance" regula-
tions, the proposal establishes no presumptions, says nothing about
tax avoidance or business purpose, lays down no rules of "re-
latedness," and prescribes no specific remedies. It is innocent, in
short, of all of the details that most comparable statutory pro-
visions of existing law possess in abundance. These omissions may
imply that the Treasury is to have a roving commission to correct
everything that in its view needs correction, and that it can pre-
scribe "regulations" that read like section 367. A more plausible
view of the Treasury's authority, however, is that its rules must
be general in content and applicability, and that the courts will
have the last word on whether or not the electing taxpayer's in-
come tax liability is "clearly reflected" by his return.ss In short,
in this area the proposal feeds the Treasury plenty of red meat,
but may produce little more than ferocious gestures.
So far as trusts are concerned, the Treasury's general power to
32 Supra at 11.
33 The 1963 version of Senator Long's proposal authorized the Treasury to proscribe
"[t]he extent to which subchapter C of Chapter 1 (relating to corporate distribution
and adjustments) ... shall net apply to transfers made by [electing] taxpayer in aIlY
taxable year for which an election .•. is in effect or for the two years immC!liately
preceding or following such taxable years." Here again, the Treasury's authority was
to issue regulations, not the type of ad hoc rulings that are handed down under § 367.
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issue "anti-avoidance" regulations is buttressed by several special
rules, but they are of limited applicability and seem inadequate
even for the modest jurisdiction they stake out for themselves. An
electing taxpayer is required to report any tax-exempt interest,
foreign source income, or similar item that is realized and accumu-
lated by a trust if "such accumulated item may ultimately vest in
[the electing taxpayer] or his estate and must ultimately vest in
such individual, his estate,· or his appointees." 34 Designed to nul-
lify attempts to insulate such items as tax-exempt interest from
the electing taxpayer's return by shifting them to trusts, this new
rule is of doubtful effectivenss. Trust indentures seldom providt>
that specific "items" of gross income shall "vest" in a bent>ficiary.
If an electing taxpayer may receive the net income of a trust, or
a fraction or stated amount thereof, or an amount unrelated to the
trust's gross or net income, how are we to decide whether it is an
"item" specified by the new rule or the trust's other income that
is used to pay trust expenses, distributed currently or accumulated
for future distribution to other beneficiaries, or accumulated for
the electing taxpayer, his estate, or his appointees? Even if this
question were answered by a statutory presumption or other rule,
the provision itself imposes no direct restrictions on the usc of
trusts to preserve deductions or other allowances as distinguished
from exclusions. Any indirect impact it may have on such arran~e­
ments (e.g., the transfer of an oil business, in order to preserv('
deductions for percentage depletion or intangible drilling costs) is
murky at best.
In another effort to prevent the electing taxpayer from takin~
the benefits of the proposed new system without incurrin~ its
burdens, the proposal would nullify section 673 (b) (two-year chari-
table trust), with the result that an electing taxpayer who esta-
blishes a trust of less than 10 years duration is governed by the
" grantor trust" rule of section 673(a) even though tht> income is
irrevocably dedicated to charity. As pointed out above, the electin~
taxpayer can preserve the substance of the charitable deduction,
34 Evidently an item is taxa-bl!.' t{) the ele{'ting tn.'\-pnyer under this rule only if it is
in fact accumulated by the trustee, but the langunge of the propos!!l is ll. bit ambiguous
on this point.
For trusts of wbieh the electing tn:xpay!.'r is the grantor, tIle propo£e!l n&u" rule E{!eJnS
to overlap the coverage of §§ 676-77 of e.~isting law to ll. largo extent, but it does Dot
contain their exceptions for powers to revest income or corpus in tlle grantor that are
not exercisable for ten years, and it also rcaclles powers exercisable only by an adverse
party" As to trusts created by other persons, the proposed rule cnn be regnrde!l as an
e.~ansionof § 678.
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even though it is ostensibly denied to him, if he is willing to create
a trust with a duration of ten years or more.3li
THE ELECTING TAXPAYER'S NON-ELECTION YEARS
Just as the optional character of the simplified tax method will
stimulate the shifting of income and deductions from the electing
taxpayer to non-electing related taxpayers, so the temporary char-
acter of an election will reward the electing taxpayer who can
shift some types of income and deductions from election to non-
election years. Mindful that personal deductions allowed by pres-
ent law will be "wasted" if incurred or paid in an election year,
the canny taxpayer will endeavor to bunch them into non-election
years; and the same strategy will apply to all other items that are
disfavored in election years (intangible drilling and development
costs, capital gains, foreign income, etc.). While some items are
not easily postponed or accelerated, others (e.g., charitable con-
tributions) are quite pliable, and the stakes are sufficiently high
for one to predict with confidence that methods will be sought-
and found-to shift them to the years in which they will be most
"useful." 36 Conversely, items of ordinary income that will be
taxed in any event should be bunched in election years when the
low simplified rates will apply, a strategy that can be readily ap-
plied to dividends from closely-he1c1 corporations, and, without
superhuman skills, to some other types of income as well.
The postponement or acceleration of items for tax advantage
would not, to be sure, be a new phenomenon; for many years the
Internal Revenue Code has rewarded the judicious timing of both
personal and business transactions. The taxpayer who has incurred
a capital loss may be well advised to sell appreciated property
this year rather than next; the percentage limits on the medical
expense and charitable contribution deductions can be avoided,
to some extent, by proper timing; the optional standard deduction
is especially appealing to the taxpayer who can arrange to malco
his charitable contributions and other deductible payments in even
35 Supra note 29.
36 Thus, a cash basis taxpayer on selling a capital asset can arrange the payment
schedule so that he will receive no more than his adjusted basis during election years,
postponing receipt of his gain until the election has expired or has been revoked, when
the favorable capital gain rate will become applicable. See supra at 14, pointing out
that the simplified tax method accepts without change the accounting rules of existing
law.
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years while taking the standard deduction in odd years; and so
on. The simplified tax method would alter the odds, however, by
increasing the probability that this type of planning will payoff.
So far as most other temptations to postpone or accelerate trans-
actions are concerned, the taxpayer must gamble: the best-laid plan
may be frustrated by an unexpected gain or loss at the end of the
current, or in the following, year. The taxpayer who has filed an
election under the simplified tax method, however, cannot lose,
and he will almost certainly gain, by postponing to a non-election
year any item that cannot be deducted while the election is in force.
Senator Long himself calls attention to the acceleration-post-
ponement threat to the integrity of the simplified ta."'{ system,31
and provides two shields against it. The first is the election's five-
year life. Even if the election were irrevocable for this period,
however, it would leave room for a good deal of manipulation at
the beginning and end of the period, especially since the taxpayer
need not commit himself to an election until three and one-half
months after the end of the first taxable year for which it is to be
effective. The five-year period shrinks in efficacy still more when
we take into account the possibility of a revocation or a change in
the Code or regulations narrowing the gap between electing and
non-electing taxpayers as a class. As is suggested above, the ele~
ting taxpayer will probably not be fenced in for more than two or
three years at a time, despite the theoretical five-year term.
The proposal's second shield against manipulation is the broad
anthority granted to the Treasury to issue regulations governing
the behavior of electing taxpayers.3S No doubt regulations could
be devised that would prevent taxpayers from arbitrarily assigning
some income items or deductions to non-election rather than ele~
tion years, or vice versa (e.g., arranging to pay interest on a resi-
dential mortgage every sixth year), where the normal pattern of
familiar transactions would have to be distorted to accomplish his
31 Supra at 8.
38 A third shield, much more specialized, consists of n. 8et of specinl rules relnting to
"accumulation distributions" by trusts under § 665(b). In brief, § 1394(f) of the
proposal would negate the "relief" provisions of § GG5(b), the five·yenr limit of
§ 666 (a), and part of § 668(a)-in order to discourage tho aecumulation of trost incomo
in non-electing years for distribution to n. beneficiary in an election year. I um indebted
to Arthur M. Michaelson, of the New York bar, for tho observation thnt the "relief"
provisions that are to be thus eliminated were themselves designed to "simplify" tho
accumulation rules of Subchapter J, and that the "simplified tmt system" will further
complicate Subchapter J if one beneficiary of n. trust is an electing tmtpnyer but others
are not.
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objective. Perhaps-I am speculating, not recommending-the reg-
ulations could provide that no item may be deducted in a non-elec-
tion year unless the taxpayer satisfies the Treasury that tax avoid-
ance was not a principal reason for paying or incurring it in that
year rather than in an election year in which it would not have been
deductible. Still another possibility is a regulation requiring all
deductions to be averaged over the election period and the three
years immediately preceding and following that period, with any
above-average amounts in the non-election years being disallowed
as deductions because of the possibility that they were bunched
for a tax avoidance purpose. A set of parallel rules for incomo
might be prescribed to prevent above-average amounts of capital
gains, tax-exempt interest, and similar items from being reported
in non-election years preceding or following the electing taxpayer's
simplified tax years.
Treasury rules of this type would be unpalatable medicine, but
without them the simplified tax method would open a host of op-
portunities for the very kind of tax "planning" that Senator Long
finds objectionable. With such safeguards, however, the glimmer
of simplification fades away. A simple tax structure cannot be
constructed by digging some holes in the Code and dumping the
debris in the regulations.
RETROACTIVE REVOCATION OF THE ELECTION
In the 1963 version of the simplified tax proposal, the taxpayer's
right to revoke his election was conditioned on the occurrence of a
specified event (substantially disadvantageous change in Code or
regulations; permanent disability, bankruptcy discharge, or " other
good cause," in the Treasury's discretion) ; and the revocation was
to take effect only when made, without retroactive effect. The 1964
version enlarges the taxpayer's freedom-he may now revoke
whenever he wishes-but he is then to be treated "as if he had
never made such election." His tax liability for the prior years of
the revoked election's five-year period must be recomputed by ap-
plying the regular tax rates to his taxable income (computed in
the normal fashion). To this recomputed liability, an additional tax
of five per cent thereof is added, and the difference between this
amount and the simplified tax actually paid is either assessed as
a deficiency or refunded. Following a retroactive revocation, the
usual five-year waiting period must elapse before the taxpayer
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may make a new election, unless the Treasury consents to an earlier
return to the simplified tax method.
In describing the new provision as a safety valve for the tax-
payer who "has suffered unexpected financial reverses," Senator
Long provided no illustrations of its intended operation, but pre-
sumably he had in mind the electing taxpayer who wants to return
to the regular method of computing his tax liability in order to take
advantage of deductions or other allowances that result from or
follow "unexpected financial reverses," and that are not available
in computing his simplified tax liability. In assessing this problem,
it should be noted that a sharp decline in business income, a net
operating loss, or a large capital loss by itself would not ordinarily
convert the election into a millstone around the taxpayer's neck,
because these items would be taken into account in computing sim-
plified taxable income. When the electing taxpayer's income drops
to a very low level, however, he may begin to regret his election,
because the non-electing low bracket taxpayer has the advantage
of lower rates (fourteen to twenty per cent) instead of the flat
twenty per cent applicable at the bottom of the simplified tax
schedule, and is also entitled to the dependency exemptions and
to either his personal deductions or the optional standard deduc-
tion.
An example is a married taxpayer who elects to compute his 1966
tax liability under the simplified tax method, but suffers "unex-
pected financial reverses" in 1967. If we assume that his 1967
simplified taxable income is $8,000 but that his regular taxable
income for the same year is $4,000 by reason of personal deductions
and dependency exemptions, a return to the regular method of
computing his tax liability would produce a 1967 saving of $980,
computed as follows:
Simplified tax liability
Regular tax liability (1965 rates)
Savings
Ifhe exercises his privilege of revoking his election retroactively
in order to save $980 in 1967, however, he must recompute his 1966
liability without the benefit of the election. Assuming that his 1966
simplified taxable income was $100,000 and his tax liability $32,600,
and that a recomputation produces taxable income of $80,000 (by
reason of non-taxable items, personal deductions, and dependency
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exemptions), a revocation of the election will cost $5,452, computed
as follows:
Regular tax liability (taxable income, $80,000, 1965 rates)
Plus: five per cent additional tax












Less: simplified tax paid
Deficiency
Thus, a retroactive revocation would cost $5,452 in additional tax
for 1966, and would save only $980 for 1967. Even if we assume
that the taxpayer's financial circumstances for 1968-1970 are identi-
cal with those for 1967, his potential savings for the four-year
period 1967-1970 would be only $3,920 (four times $980)-not
enough to justify the retroactive revocation for 1966. A retroactive
revocation would be even less appealing if the taxpayer had en-
joyed two (or more) years of tax reduction by reason of the elec-
tion, or if the gap between his simplified tax liability and his
"regular" tax liability in those years had been greater than in the
example.
A retroactive revocation will become more appealing if we as-
sume that the taxpayer's 1966 simplified taxable income was
$50,000 and his regular taxable income $44,000:
Regular tax liability (1965 rates)
Plus: five per cent additional tax
Even on these revised assumptions regarding the taxpayer's 1966
income, however, it will take more than one year of post-revocation
savings to recoup the deficiency for 1966. If we vary our assump-
tions to postulate that his circumstances for 1966 and 1967 are as
described above for 1966, and his circumstances for 1968-1970
(the remaining three years of the normal five-year election period)
are as described for 1967, he would have to pay $2926 (for 1966-
1967) in order to save $2940 (for 1968-1970)-a net savings of
$14. Quite aside from the pain of paying the deficiency for 1966-
1967 before realizing the savings for 1968-1970, and even if the
potential savings were much greater, it might be better strategy
to refrain from making a retroactive revocation in 1968, in the hope
that a disadvantageous change in the Oode or regulations will
permit a "free" prospective revocation.
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If the privilege of revoking the election retroactively is of limited
assistance to taxpayers suffering "unexpected financial re-
verses,"38a its value to electing taxpayers who enjoy unexpected
:financial success is dramatic. To illustrate: assume that the
$100,000 taxpayer described above realizes an unexpected $100,000
long-term capital gain in 1967, in addition to ordinary income of
$100,000. For him, the savings in 1967 of a return to the regular
tax system would be $24,260 :
Simplified tax CSTI: $200,000)
Regular tax liability Ctaxable income,









Thus, in a single year, he can more than recoup the cost ($5,452 per
year) of revoking his election for four prior years. For the $50,000
taxpayer postulated in the preceding paragraph, an unexpected
capital gain of as little as $50,000 will similarly make it profitable
for him to revoke an election that has been in effect for four years.3\)
Aside from a long-term capital gain on a sale of securities, an
electing taxpayer who strikes it rich in oil, exercises a stock option
when the spread between the option price and the stock's fair
market is unexpectedly large, receives a lump sum payment on
terminating a "Louis B. Mayer" employment contract, inherits a
portfolio of tax exempt bonds, or recovers damages for personal
injuries-the list could be easily extended-may save far more on
revoking his election than he must pay for the privilege. Even if a
taxpayer knew several years in advance that he would engage in
such a transaction, he might find it advantageous to elect in order
to use the temporary tax savings in his business, repaying it on
revoking the election. The investment could well yield a greater
38:1 In speaking of taxpayers suffering U unexpected 1inancinl rOi'erses, " Senator
Long offered no specific instances of the intended application of this promion, so I hai'e
had to extrapolate from his general statement. I have obviously not exhausted the possi-
bilities with my examples, but they seem to me reasonable tests of tho promion in
question.
39 lIis savings for the year in which he realizes II. long-term enpitnl gain of $50,000
would be $6,100:
Simplified tax liability (STI: $100,000)
Regular tax liability (tamble income, $94,000, of which $50,000 is
capital gain)
Savings
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return than the additional tax of five per cent plus the interest
charged on the deficiency upon revocation.40
Less dramatic but more important than elections made solely to
be revoked will be elections by taxpayers who hope or expect to
receive capital gains or other special items but cannot accurately
predict the amount or the year of receipt. It is reasonable to assume
that many high-bracket electing taxpayers will find themselves in
this position and that the prudent course for many of them would
be an election, to be followed by a revocation if and when the facts
so fall out as to make it advisableY The point to be made about
these taxpayers, aside from the fact that they have not suffered
the "unexpected financial reverses" that are the ostensible reason
for allowing elections to be revoked retroactively, is that they
will have to reappraise their circumstances every year in order to
decide whether to revoke without further delay or not. As timo
passes, it may become easier to predict the amount of the special
item and its year of receipt, and a revocation a year or two before
it is received may be cheaper than a last-minute revocation. More-
over, such a taxpayer may be able to postpone or accelerate some
types of income and outgo, and his financial strategy will be af-
40 For example, the hypothetical ta.."'{payer wllOse circumstances are described by Senn-
tor Long to illustrate the operation of his proposal (Table 8, Case B, 110 Congo Rec. 23,OVO
would save about $122,000 by electing the simplified method because his regular linbility
would be about $603,000 and his simplified liabilit~ only $481,000. If 110 revoked his
election a year later, he would have to repay about $102,300 ($122,000, plus 5% of
$603,000, plus 6% on the sum of these amounts). Thus, he would have had the Use of
$122,000 for one year at a cost of about $40,300. This is not the prime rate, but business
men have been known to pay even more than this for money, and like William Zecken-
dorf, the electing taxpayer might prefer "to be alive at 25% rather than dead at the
prime rate." Moreover, on other assumptions, including a longer time span, the annual
cost of the temporary tax saving would be lower than in this case.
41 Prudence may also suggest an election by a ta.."'{payer with substantial ordinary
income (salary, dividends, interest, etc.) who participates in an exchange producing
substantial capital gain that arguably qualifies for non·recognition. If the transaction
is held to qualify, the simplified tax will be advantageous; otllerwise, on learning that
his assumption was erroneous, he can revoke his eleetion in order to qualify for the 25%
tax eeiling on long·term eapital gain applicable to non·eleeting taxpayers. Once tllO
status of the item is questioned, the taxpayer will have to deeide whether to revoko
i=ediately, or to stand his ground and revoke only if and wIlen the item is llOld to
be taxable. If he revokes immediately, and ultimately loses, he ,\ill Imve saved the 5%
additional tax for the post·revoeation years; but if he wins, his rovocation will have
lost him the benefit of the simplified tax rate for tllOse same years. On the other hand,
if he does not revoke when the item is questioned, he will preserve his right to the simpli-
fied tax rate, but at the eost of an additional 5% for the remaining years of the five-
year period if a revocation becomes neeessary. (Apparently a revocation cannot be rein·
stated; see infra note 44.) A revoeation is evidently possible even if he has unsuccess-
fully litigated the eleetion year; see S1tpra note 13.
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fected by the likelihood of a revocation. I detect no net gain for tax
simpli.fication here, especially when we also note that in deciding
whether and when to revoke, account must be taken of the five-year
waiting period that must elapse before a new election may be
made.
Retroactive revocations are likely to be especially common among
the 250,000 taxpayers in the $10,000-50,000 adjusted gross income
class who, according to the Treasury, will elect the simpli.fied tax
method. Since an average taxpayer in this category will save only
about $350 per year by making the election,42 a modest change in
his economic circumstances will be sufficient to stimulate a revoca-
tion-a $5,000 long-term capital gain, casualty loss, medical ex-
pense, charitable contribution, tort recovery, interest payment,
etc., etc., will often be enough, and in some cases a $1,000 item or
even a new dependency exemption may suffice. In a realistic as-
sessment of the revocation procedure, we ought to assume that
virtually all of the 250,000 taxpayers in the $10,000-50,000 adjusted
gross income class will be on the verge of a revocation at all times;
and that this assumption will be equally valid for many of the
55,000 electing taxpayers in the $50,000-100,000 adjusted gross
income class, for whom the average annual savings from an election
will be about $1,550.43 It is equally reasonable to assume that many
of these taxpayers will fail to retain their records, will be indignant
when deductions for prior years are disallowed after a revocation;'"'
and will not bless the day they were told that the "simplified tax
method" would enable them "to forego the difficulties of record
keeping, accounting, and reporting [personal] expenses."
WOULD THE SDrPLIFIED TAX SDfi>LIFy7
Because of Senator Long's stress on simpli.fication of the federal
income tax system-"it [the proposal] would reverse the trend
to an ever-increasing complexity and show our determination to
achieve simpli.fication' '-I now turn to an evaluation of this claim,
which is exempli.fied by the new terms, "simpli.fied tax method,"
"simplified tax," and "simpli.fied taxable income." For conveni-
ence, I shall discuss separately the effect of the newmethod on those
42 Supra note 4-
43 Supra note 4-
44.As I read the proposal, a taxpayer who revokes an election cannot reinstate it on
finding that his proof of itemized deduetions will not stand up nt the ndministrativo
level or in eourt. His plight will be somewhat nlleviated, however, if the ceiling on the
standard deduction is increased to $2,000, as Senator Long proposes.
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who do not elect ("nay-sayers") and on three categories of electing
taxpayers (" cake-eaters," "fence-straddlers," and "loyalists").
NAy-SAYERS
For non-electing taxpayers, of course, the simplified tax method
would achieve no simplification; to the contrary, it would introduce
into the law a new complexity by requiring the merits of an election
to be weighted against its disadvantages. This would not be a
matter of simple arithmetic, since a taxpayer for whom the election
would not be attractive under existing conditions would want to
see whether his affairs could be re-arranged so that an election
would become advantageous. His computation, moreover, would
be incomplete without an estimate of the cost of keeping the election
in effect for part or all of its normal five-year period and, in the
alternative, of revoking should it come to be an albatross around
his neck. For those who decide after study that the election is not,
and cannot be made, more attractive than the non-elective method,
the mere existence of the "simplified" alternative would increase
the complexity of existing law. Many would be called, but few
would be chosen.
How many taxpayers will find it prudent to make the alternative
simplified tax calculation, only to decide against an election7In the
absence of a more authoritative estimate by the Treasury, I should
suppose that most of the 1.2 million taxpayers filing taxable returns
with adjusted gross income of $20,000 or more would make a trial
calculation. The Treasury estimates, as indicated above, that about
300,000 of these taxpayers would actually elect. When we descend
to the $10,000-20,000 adjusted gross income class, the Treasury
estimates that only 10,000 of the 5.7 million taxpayers in this
category would elect, and no doubt most of the others would not
even be within striking distance of an election. Even so, a substan-
tial number of them would have to make the calculation to be sure
that they were not passing up a good thing.4u All in all, I think a
45 For the 5.6 million married taxpayers in this adjusted gross income class, the simpli-
fied tax would ordinarily not be preferable to the "regular" tax. This is becnuse a
married taxpayer with $20,000 of adjusted gross income would, llt a minimum, be entitled
to an optional standard deduction of $2,000 (see supra note 5, re proposed increase in
ceiling on standard deduction) and personal exemptions of $1,200, resulting in tnxnblo
income of $16,800 and a. "regular" tax liability of $3,504 (nt 1965 rntes). Assuming
no other relevant facts, this taxpayer's simplied taxable income would be $18,800 (ad-
justed gross income of $20,000 less personal exemptions of $1,200), on which the simpli-
fied tax liability would be $3,760. In some cases, however, an election would be prefer-
able; for example, if the taxpayer just described was entitled to an alimony deduction
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review
HeinOnline -- 21 Tax L. Rev. 33 1965-1966
1965] OPTIONAL SIMPLIFIED INCOME TAX 33
good case can be made for the proposition that the simplified tax
system would require ~ore man-hours of wasted effort by non-
electing taxpayers than it would save for electing taxpayers.
Finally, since the simplified tax system does not eliminate any of
the substantive provisions of existing law for non-electing tax-
payers, they and their tax advisers, as well as the Internal Revenue
Service, will continue to be concerned with interpreting and apply-
ing these provisions. Not a word of the Code, nor a single ruling,
regulation, or judicial decision, will be made obsolete or irrelevant,
and few will be much diminished in importance, by the new com-
plexities that are added by the simplified tax method.
CAKE-EATERS
Because the simplified tax method is optional with the taxpayer
and binds even the electing taxpayer for a limited period only, it
invites him to shift disfavored items to non-election years or to
related non-electing taxpayers, while applying the low simplified
rates to his residual "simplified taxable income" in election years.
I have already described some of the devices that taxpayers may
of $2,000 but to no other personal deductions, his ta:mble income and "regular" tn.x
liability would remain unchanged, but his simplified ta:mble income would be reduced
to $16,800, on which the simplified tax liability would be $3,36o-a sarings of $144. Tnx-
payers with employee bnsiness expenses or § 212 investment expenses that nre displaced
by the optional standard deduction, but allowed in computing simplified ta:mble income,
could also :find an election preferable.
For the 260,000 single taxpayers and 115,000 hend of honsehold taxpayers in the
$10,000-20,000 adjusted gross income class (1962), the threshold for profiting from an
election is lower than for married taxpayers. A single taxpayer with $13,000 of ndjustcd
gross income, claiming the standard deduction of $1,300 (nssuming an incrense in the
ceiling, as proposed by Senator Long) and one personal exemption of $600, would incur
a tax liability at 1965 rates of $2,542 on taxable income of $1l,000. Assuming no other
relevant facts, his simplified taxable income would be $12,400 and his simplified tnx
liability would be $2,480. The savings is small ($62), but it will incrcnsc substantially
as adjusted gross income rises from $13,000 to $20,000.
In the absence of a more precise estimate by Treasury statisticians, I should not be
surprised if as many as five taxpayers would find it prudent to cnlculatc their simplified
tax liability for every one who actunlly made the election. Of course, ndministrntive
guidelines could be devised to identify some classes of taxpayers who should not bother
to make the alternative calculations, and it may be possible to transfer some responsi-
bilities in this area to IRS computers. Lest it be thought that this task is comparable
to announcing that the alternative capital gain cnleulation of existing lnw cannot be
advantageous to taxpayers with less than $26,000, $38,000, or $52,000 of tmmble income
(separate, head of household, and joint returns), however, it should be noted that many
more factors enter into a comparison of a. taxpayer's simplified tn.x liability with his
"regular" liability, at least for the 7.9 million taxpayers with adjnsted gross income
of $10,000 or more.
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employ to eat their cake and have it too.4un Even if the Treas~
ury's protective measures succeed in frustrating some of these ef~
forts, and despite the elimination of whatever deductions and other
allowances these taxpayers are unable to postpone, I would not
count on a net gain for simplification in this category of taxpayers.
FENOE-STRADDLERS
For the reasons set out above,46 some taxpayers (including some
"cake-eaters") will elect the simplified tax method with little or no
intention of adhering to it for the normal five-year period. For
such a taxpayer, revocation of the election will have to be debated
whenever a change in the Code or Regulations offers him a free
choice, and the privilege of revoking retroactively may cause him to
reassess his status every year.47 If he is foresighted, he will retain
the same records to support his itemized deductions as a non~elect~
ing taxpayer; but he will have to preserve them for a longer period,
because a retroactive revocation of his election may affect years
on which the normal three-year statute of limitations has run. These
fence-straddlers will benefit from the simplified tax method, but
it will simplify nothing for them.
LOYALISTS
My final category consists of taxpayers who will elect the simpli-
fied tax method with every expectation of keeping their elections
in force for the full five-year period, and perhaps indefinitely. A
taxpayer is most likely to fall into this category if he enjoys a con~
sistently high level of income (e.g., $50,000 or more) from personal
services, but has little or no invested capital that might generate
long-term capital gains (and thus stimulate a revocation of the
election) or that might be shifted to non-electing related taxpayers
45n Supra at 19.
46 Supra at 26.
47 In proposing the 1963 version of the simplified tax method, Senator Long said:
It may be objeeted that, even for the group nfIeeted, the program is not a simplifIca-
tion beeause taxpayers would have to eompare their tax under the present system with
the tax under the optional program before deeiding whether to eleet. Thus two computa-
tions of tax would be required where one suffiees today. This reasoning overlooks the fact
that the eleetion is irrevoeable for five years. Onee the election is made, the tnxpnyl.'r
would follow the simple system for the next four years without any need for altemative
eomputations.
The premise of an irrevocable election, on whieh this argument rested, was debatablo
even in 1963 (supra at -), and it was further undermined by the addition in 1964 of
the privilege of a retroaetive revoeation. Despite this, the argument is repented verbatim
in support of the 1964 proposal.
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in order to perpetuate tax allowances that he cannot enjoy directly.
These taxpayers, and the revenue agents who examine their re-
turns, would not be concerned with deductions for taxes, charitable
contributions, medical expenses, etc. for as long as the election re-
mained in effect. To this extent, Senator Long is on solid ground in
likening the simpli.fi.ed tax method to the optional standard deduc-
tion of existing law.
Viewed in terms of scale, however, the analogy is fallacious. For
1962, the optional standard deduction was employed on 36 million
returns. One can hardly overstate the administrative savings that
results from eliminating itemized personal deductions from this
many returns, most of them filed by low income taxpayers whose
records are rudimentary at best. A comparable contribution to
simpli.fi.cation would not result, however, from eliminating the
itemized deductions of a limited number of "loyalist" taxpayers,
most of them at an adjusted gross income level ($100,000 and
over) 48 where reasonably accurate records are common and where
an audit of the return is likely in any event. The 1964 version of
the simpli.fi.ed tax is accompanied, as has been mentioned, by a
proposal to increase the minimum standard deduction by $100
(from $300 to $400 for single persons and from $400 to $500 for
married taxpayers), and to raise the ceiling on the standard deduc-
tion from $1,000 (present law) to $2,000. Either of these recom-
mendations, which would affect 11 and 2.5 million returns respec-
tively, would surely save far more man-hours of record-keeping
and calculations for both taxpayers and the government than the
simpli.fi.ed tax method, yet their estimated revenue costs are about
the same.49
Another source of simpli.fi.cation for "loyalists" is the :flat fifty
per cent rate applicable to simpli.fi.ed taxable income above $50,000
(separate returns) or $100,000 (joint returns), which should serve
to alleviate some of the timing problems that are inherent in a
progressive rate structure. Before counting our chickens, however,
we must note that an acceleration of deductions or postponement
of income confers benefits even if the taxpayer's marginal tax rate
481 have already explained (supra at 31) why the 250,000 electing ttapllycrs in the
$20,000-50,000 adjusted gross income class cannot be regarded CIS "loynlists.JJ Of the
55,000 electing taxpayers in the $50,000-100,000 adjusted gross class, for whom an elec-
tion will mean an average annnal savings of only $1,500 (supra notc 4), mnny will obvi-
ously be "c:ike-eaters" and "fence-straddlers" rather than "loynlists. JJ
49 Increased minimnm standard deduction, $270 million; increased ceiling on stnndard
deduction, $210 million; simplliied t:u: method, $225 million.
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remains unchanged, as witness the frequent disputes over the
timing of items in corporate returns subject to a flat rate of tn."'\:.
Moreover, only 8,000 of the estimated 313,000 electing taxpayers
will have adjusted gross income of over $100,000, and most of
those below this level (few of whom will be "loyalists" in any
event), will be subject to a rate schedule that varies from twenty
to forty per cent. With this much variation in marginal rates, the
timing of items of income and deductions will continue to be im-
portant; indeed, much of technical "lmow-how" in this area had
its origin in the 1920's, when the spread from one taxable year to
another in the taxpayer's marginal rate was seldom greater than
twenty percentage points.
The full inclusion of capital gains in simplified taxable income
could contribute to simplification, by reducing disputes over the
classification of border-line items and eliminating the incentive to
convert ordinary income into capital gain. The optional character
of the proposal, however, severely restricts the achievement of the
goal, because the receipt of a large long-term capital gain is likely
to stimulate the taxpayer to revoke his election, if indeed the ex-
pectation of the gain did not keep him from electing at the outset.
Moreover, since capital losses incurred by an electing taxpayer can
be offset only against capital gains and $1,000 of ordinary income
(as under existing law), the proper classification of borderline
transactions remains important, and the conversion of ordinary
income into capital gain will continue to be advantageous. I see
no reason, therefore, why a taxpayer who has elected the simplified
tax method should renounce the stimulating and profitable search
for long-term capital gains.
CONCLUSIO'N
In conclusion, despite Senator Long's hope that the simplified
tax method will "reduce the premium enjoyed by the taxpayer who
has tax lawyers and accountants to show him ways to avoid paying
taxes to his federal government," its enactment would unquestion-
ably expand, rather than diminish, the professional opportunities
of readers of this periodical. In my opinion, it would rank with tho
special treatment of capital gains and losses and the separate tax-
ation of corporate income in becoming one of the main structural
sources of complexity in the Internal Revenue Code. Senator Long
has argued that
a considerable number of taxpayers who will elect the simpli-
fied tax plan will spend more time earning money and less
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time concocting tax avoidance arrangements, some of which
are uneconomical and contrary to public policy, and all of
which cause substantial losses in Government revenue.
I am less sure than Senator Long that taxpayers can ealn more
money if they spend less time on tax avoidance (or vice versa);
but if in fact one of these activities can only be carried on at the
expense of the other, I would conclude that enactment of the simpli-
fied tax system would reduce rather than increase the time devoted
to "earning money."
S. 3250, 88th Congress, 2d Session
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
OOTOBER 2, 1964
Mr. Long of Louisiana introduced the following bill; which was read twice
and referred to the Committee on Finance
A BILL
To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to provide an optional
simplified tax method, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of A'Jnerica in Oongress assembled,
SEC. 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as "The Simplified Tax Method Act of
1964".
SEC. 2. SIMPLIFIED TAX METHOD FOR ELECTING D.TDIVIDUALS.
(a) IN GENERAL.-Chapter 1 (relating to normal taxes and sur-
taxes) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new
subchapter:
"Subchapter U-Election of Simplified Tax Method
"Sec. 1391. Election of simplified tax.
"Sec. 1392. Simplified tax imposed.
"Sec. 1393. Simplified taxable income defined.
"Sec. 1394. Special rules.
"SEC. 1391. ELECTION OF SIMPLIFIED TAX.
" (a) GEl\TERAL RULE. -Except as provided in this subsection and
subsection (f), an individual may, for any taxable year, elect to
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.D. Tax Law Review
HeinOnline -- 21 Tax L. Rev. 38 1965-1966
38 TAX LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:
be subject to the simplified tax imposed by section 1392 in lieu of the
tax imposed by section 1 or section 1201. An election under this sec-
tion may not be made by-
"(1) an estate or trust,
"(2) a nonresident alien individual, or
"(3) a married individual, unless his spouse also makes an
election under this section, or has made an election, which is
in effect for such taxable year, and unless such individual and his
spouse have the same taxable year.
" (b) ELECTION.-
"(1) WHEN MADE.-Except as provided in paragraph (2),
an election under this section for any taxable year shall be made
within the time prescribed by law (not including extensions
thereof) for filing the return for such taxable year.
"(2) YEARS PRIOR TO ISSUANCE OF REGULATIONS.-An election
under this section for any taxable year ending prior to the date
of the first publication of regulations prescribed by the Secretary
or his delegate under section 1394 may be made within 90 days
after such date.
"(3) MANNER.-An election under this section shall be made
in such manner as the Secretary or his delegate shall by regula-
tions prescribe.
"(c) YEARS FOR WHICH EFFECTIVE.-An election under this
section shall be effective for the taxable year for which it is made
and for each of the four taxable years immediately succeeding
such taxable year, unless, with respect to any such taxable year,
it is revoked under subsection (d) or (e) terminated under sub-
section (f).
"(d) REVOCATION OF ELECTION.- An election under this section
may be revoked (at such time and in such manner as the Secretary
or his delegate shall by regulations prescribe) by the taxpayer
for any taxable year with respect to which-
"(1) amendments (made after the date of such election) to
this subtitle or to the regulations prescribed thereunder become
effective, and the Secretary or his delegate determines that n
major portion of the difference (computed without regard to such
amendments) between
"(A) the tax liability of electing taxpayers as a class under
this subchapter, and
" (B) the tax liability of electing taxpayers as a class whioh
would exist under this chapter but for this subchapter
is eliminated by reason of such amendments; or
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" (2) the taxpayer-
"(A) becomes disabled (within the meaning of section
213(g) (3)) and at least 50 percent of his gross income for the
5 taxable years immediately preceding such taxable year con-
sisted of earned income (as defined in section 911(b) ); or
" (B) is discharged in bankruptcy.
A revocation under this subsection shall be effective for the tax-
able year for which made and for all succeding taxable years.
"(e) RETROACTIVE REVOCATION OF ELECTION.-
" (1) RETROACTIVE REVOCATION.- An election under this section
may be revoked (at such time and in such manner as the Secre-
tary or his delegate shall by regulations prescribe) by the tax-
payer for any taxable year.
"(2) EFFECT OF RETROACTIVE REVOCATION.-In the case of a
revocation, under this subsection, of an election, except as pro-
vided in paragraphs (3) and (4), the taxpayer shall be treated
(under regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary or his
delegate) as if he had never made such election.
"(3) ADDITIONAL TAX.-In the case of a revocation of an
election under this subsection, in addition to the tax imposed by
section 1 or section 1201, there is imposed for each year for
which the election so revoked would have been effective, a tax
equal to 5 percent of the tax imposed by section 1 or section 1201.
"(4) STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.-Notwithstanding any law or
rule of law-
"(A) any deficiency attributable to a revocation under this
subsectionmay be assessed and
"(B) any claim for refund or credit relating to an over-
payment attributable to a revocation under this section may be
filed
at any time within 3 years of the date on which the revocation
is made.
"(f) TERMINATION OF ELECTION.-In the case of a married in-
dividual, an election under this section shall terminate commencing
with any taxable year for which an election under this section is
not in effect for his spouse.
"(g) ELECTION AFTER EXPIRATION, REVOCATION, OR TElUt£mATION
OF PRIOR ELECTION.-
"(1) IN GENERAL.-If a taxpayer has made an election under
this section which has expired in accordance with subsection (c),
has been revoked under subsection (d) or (3), or has terminated
under subsection (f), such taxpayer may not, except as provided
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in paragraph (2), make an election under this section for any of
the 5 taxable years following the last taxable year for which his
prior election was in effect.
"(2) EXCEPTIONS.-Notwithstanding paragraph (1)-
"(A) in the case of an election which has expired in accord-
ance with subsection (c), an election under this section may
be made for the first taxable year following the last taxable
year for which the prior election was in effect; and
" (B) an election under this section may be made for any
taxable year if the Secretary or his delegate consents to such
election.
"(h) RULES FOR DETERMINING MARITAL STATUS, ETc.-For pur-
poses of this subchapter-
"(1) MARITAL STATus.-Section 143 (relating to determination
of marital status) shall apply in determining whether an indi-
vidual is married for any taxable year.
"(2) TAXABLE YEARS OF HUSBAND AND WIFE.-If the taxable
years of a husband and wife begin on the same day and end
on different days because of the death of either or both, they
shall be treated as having the same taxable year. The preceding
sentence shall not apply with respect to the surviving spouse if
he remarries before the close of his taxable year.
"SEC. 1392. SIMPLIFIED TAX IMPOSED.
" (a) RATES OF TAx.-A tax is hereby imposed for each taxable
year for which an election under section 1391 is in effect, as follows:
"(1) INDIVIDuALS.-In the case of an individual other than an
individual to whom paragraph (2) or (3) applies, the lesser of-
"(A) the tax determined in accordance with the following
table:
If the taxable income is: The tax is:
Not over $10.000. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20% of the simplified taxable in-
come.
Over $10,000 but not over $14,000.. $2,000, plus 25% of the excess over
$10,000.
Over $14,000 but not over $18,000.. $3,000, plus 30% of the excess over
$14,000.
Over $18,000 but not over $32,000. . $4,200, plus 35% of the excess over
$18,000.
Over $32,000 but not over $50,000 $9,000, plus 40% of the excess over
$32,000.
Over $50,000. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $16,300, plus 50% of the excess over
$50,000.
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; or
"(B) a tax on simplified taxable income computed at the
rates provided by section 1 (a) (relating to rates of tax on
individuals) .
"(2) HEADs OF HOUSEHOLDS.-In the case of a head of a house-
hold (as defined in section1(b) (2)) the lesser of.-
"(A) the tax determined in accordance with the following
table:
If the taxable income is: The tax is:
Not over $10,000....... . . . . .. . . . 20% of the simplified taxable in-
come.
Over $10,000 but not over $14,000. . $2,000, plus 22.5% of the excess
over $10,000.
Over $14,000 but not over $18,000. . $2,900, plus 25.0% of the excess
over $14,000.
Over $18,000 but not over $20,000. . $3,900, plus 27.5% of the excess
over $18,000.
Over $20,000 but not over $28,000. . $4,450, plus 30.0% of the excess
over $20,000.
Over $28,000 but not over $32,000. . $6,850, plus 32.5% of the excess
over $28,000.
Over $32,000 but not over $36,000. . $8,150, plus 35.0% of the excess
over $32,000.
Over $36,000 but not over $50,000. . $9,550, plus 37.5% of the excess
over $36,000.
Over $50,000 but not over $64,000. . $14,800, plus 42.5% of the excess
over $50,000.
Over $64,000 but not over $100,000. $20,750, plus 45.0% of the excess
over $64,000.
Over $100,000 but not over $150,000 $36,950, plus 50.0% of the excess
over $100,000.
; or
"(B) a tax on simplified taxable income computed at the
rates provided by section l(b) (relating to rates of tax on
heads of households).
"(3) MAImIED INDIVIDUALS WHO FILE JOINT RETURNS AND SUR-
VIVING SPOUSES.-In the case of a husband and wife who file a
joint return under section 6013 and in the case of a surviving
spouse (as defined in section 2(b) ) the lesser of.-
"(A) the tax determined in accordance with the following
table:
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If the taxable income is: The tax is:
Not over $20,000. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20% of the simplified taxable in-
come.
Over $20,000 but not over $28,000. . $4,000, plus 25% of the excess
over $20,000.
Over $28,000 but not over $36,000. . $6,000, plus 30% of the excess
over $28,000.
Over $36,000 but not over $64,000. . $8,400, plus 35% of the excess
over $36,000.
Over $64,000 but not over $100,000. $18,200, plus 40% of the excess
over $64,000.
Over $100,000. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $32,000, plus 50% of the excess
over $100,000.
; or
, , (B) a tax on simplified taxable income computed under
section 2 (relating to tax in case of joint return or return of
surviving spouse).
"(b) CREDITS AGAINST SIMPLIFIED TAx.-For any taxable year
with respect to which an election under section 1391 is in effect,
no credit against tax shall be allowed under section 35 (relating
to partially tax-exempt interest received by individuals) or 37
(relating to retirement income).
"SEC. 1393. SIMPLIFIED TAXABLE INCOME DEFINED.
"(a) IN GENERAL.-For purposes of this subtitle, the term 'sim_
plified taxable income' means adjusted gross income (as defined
in section 62), increased as provided by subsections (b) and (c),
and reduced as provided in subsection (d).
" (b) AMOUNTS TO ADJUSTED GROSS INCOME.-For purposes of
subsection (a), adjusted gross income shall be increased by-
"(1) AMOUNTS OTHERWISE EXCLUDED.-AmOunts excluded from
gross income under part ill of subchapter B of chapter 1
(relating to items specifically excluded from gross income), ex-
cept amounts describedm-
"(A) subsections (a) and (d) of section 101 (relating to
proceeds of life insurance contracts),
" (B) section 102 (relating to gifts and inheritances),
"(C) section 108 (relating to income from discharge of in-
debtedness), and
"(D) section 111 (relating to recovery of bad debts, prior
taxes, and delinquency amounts).
"(2) INCOME FROM SOURCES OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES, ETO.-
Amounts excluded from gross income under-
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"(A) sections 893 (relating to compensation of employees
of foreign governments), 911 (relating to earned income from
sources without the United States), 912 (relating to exemp-
tion for certain allowances received from the United States),
931 (relating to income from sources within possessions of the
. United States), and 943 (relating to exclusion of dividends to
residents of Formosa or Hong Kong), and
"(B) any treaty of the United States (notwithstanding sec-
tion 894, relating to income exempt under treaty).
"(3) SOCIAL SECURITY .AND RAILROAD llETlllE?lrENT BENEFITS.-
Two-thirds of all amounts received as a pension or annuity under
title II of the Social Security Act or under the Railroad Retire-
ment Acts of 1935 or 1937.
"(4) UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFlTS.-AmOunts received from a
State or a political subdivision thereof, or from the United States,
on account of unemployment.
"(5) CONTRmUTIONs TO EMPLOYEES 2 TRUST2 ETc.-Contribu-
tions, described in sections 403(b) (relating to taxability of
beneficiaries under certain annuities), 404(a) (relating to general
rule for deduction for contributions of an employer to an em-
ployees'trust, etc.), 404(b) (relating to method of contribution,
etc., having the effect of a plan), and 405 (c) (relating to deduc-
tion for contributions to bond purchase plans), made on behalf
of the taxpayer and not otherwise included in gross income, but
only to the extent that the taxpayer's rights to or derived from
such contributions are nonforfeitable during his taxable year.
For purposes of this par%OTaph, the Secretary or his delegate
may by regulations prescribe that contingencies which are not
substantial shall not be taken into account in determining
whether an employee's rights are nonforfeitable. This paragraph
shall not apply to contributions made on behalf of a taxpayer
who is an employee within the meaning of section 401(c) (1) (re-
lating to self-employed individuals).
"(6) SECURITIES OF THE EMPLOYER CORPOBATION.-Am.Ounts
excluded from income under the second sentence of section 402
(a) (1) (relating to general rule for taxability of beneficiary of
exempt trust) or the second sentence of section 402(a) (2) (re-
lating to capital gains treatment for certain distributions).
"(7) EXERCISE OF CERTAIN STOCK OPTIONS.-In the case of the
transfer of a share of stock to a taxpayer pursuant to his ex-
ercise, during the taxable year, of an option which meets the
requirements of section 422(a) (relating to general rule for
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qualified stock options), 423(a) (relating to general rule for em-
ployee stock purchase plans), or 424(a) (relating to general rule
for restricted stock options), an amount equal to the excess of
the fair market value of the share so transferred over the price
paid under such option for such share.
"(8) GROUP-TERM LIFE INSURANCE.-Amolmts equal to the cost
(determined on the basis of uniform premiums, computed on
the basis of 5-year age brackets, under regulations prescribed
by the Secretary or his delegate) of group-term life insurance
on the life of the taxpayer provided for part or all of the tax-
able year under a policy (or policies) can-ied directly or indi-
rectly by the taxpayer '8 employer (or employers).
" (c) DEDUCTIONS DENIED.-For purposes of subsection (a), ad-
justed gross income shall be increased by an amount equal to the
deductions allowed under-
"(1) TAXES ON OR MEASURED BY NET INCoME.-Sections 162 (re-
lating to trade or business expenses), 164 (relating to a deduc-
tion for taxes), and 212 (relating to expenses for the production
of income), for any State, local, or foreign tax on or measured
by net income.
"(2) CmcULATION EXPENDITUREs.-Section 173 (relating to
circulation expenditures).
"(3) AGRICULTURAL EXPENDITUREs.-Sections 175 (relating to
soil and water conservation expenditures), 180 (relating to ex-
penditures by farmers for fertilizer, etc.), and 182 (relating to
expenditures by farmers for clearing land).
"(4) NATURAL REsoURcEs.-Sections 263(c) (relating to intan-
gible drilling and development costs in the case of oil and gas
wells), 613 (relating to percentage depletion), 615 (relating to
exploration expenditures), and 616 (relating to development
expenditures) .
"(5) SELF-EMPLOYED INDIVIDUALs.-Sections 404 (relating to
deduction for contributions of an employer to an employees'
trust, etc.), and 405(c) (relating to deduction for contributions
to bond purchase plans), to the extent attributable to contribu-
tions made on behalf of an individual who is an employee within
the meaning of section 401(c) (1) (relating to self-employed in-
dividuals).
"(6) CAPITAL GAINs.-Section 1202 (relating to deduction
for capital gains).
"(d) DEDUCTIONS ALLoWED.-For purposes of subsection (a),
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adjusted gross income shall (except as otherwise provided in sub-
section (c) ) be reduced by an amount equal to-
"(1) PERSONAL EXEl\IPTIONs.-The deductions allowed by sec-
tion 151 (relating to allowance of deductions for personal exemp-
tions) , other than the additional deductions for age and blindness
allowed by subsections (c) and (d) of such section.
"(2) TRADE AND BUSINESS EXPENSES OF E1I1PLOYEEs.-The deduc-
tions allowed by this chapter (other than by part VII of sub-
chapter B, relating to additional itemized deductions for individ-
uals) which are attributable to a trade or business which consists
of the performance of services by the taxpayer as an employee.
"(3) EXPENSES FOR PRODUCTION OF INcolltE.-The deductions
allowed by section 212 (relating to expenses for production of
income).
"(4) .ALIl\IONY~ ETC.~ PAYMENTs.-The deductions allowed by
section 215 (relating to alimony, etc., payments).
"(5) DEDUCTIONS ALLOOABLE TO lTElIrs REQ.UIRED TO BE INCLUDED
IN GROSS INco1ltE.-The deductions allocable to items required to
be added to adjusted gross income under subsection (b), to the
extent that such amounts would be allowed as deductions but for
the fact that such items were not otherwise included in gross
mcome.
" (e) ITEMS NOT To BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT MORE THAN ONOE.-
Nothing in this section shall permit the same item to be deducted
more than once or included in income more than once.
"(f) CRoss-REFERENCES.-
"(1) For special provisions relating to contributions to em-
ployees' trusts, etc., see section 407.
"(2) For special provisions relating to stock options, see section
425(i).
"(3) For special provisions relating to trusts, see section 679.
"SEC. 1394. SPECIAL RULES.
"(a) REGULATIONS To PREVENT AVOIDANCE OF TAX.-The Secre-
tary or his delegate shall prescribe such regulations as he may
deem necessary in order that the income tax liability of any tax-
payer who makes an election under section 1391, before, during,
and after the period for which the election is effective, may be
returned, determined, computed, assessed, collected, and adjusted,
in such manner as clearly to reflect the income tax liability of such
taxpayer and the various factors necessary for the determination
of such liability, and in order to prevent avoidance of such tax
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liability. Such regulations may provide for the distribution, ap-
portionment, or allocation of gross income, exclusions, deductions,
credits, allowances, and items described in section 1393 between
or among a taxpayer who has made an election under this sec-
tion and any other person or persons. A taxpayer who makes an
election under section 1391 shall be considered to have consented to
the regulations under this section which are in effect on the date
of such election.
"(b) CERTAIN PROVISIONS INAPPLIOABLE.-For any taxable year,
for which an election under section 1391 is in effect, the following
provisions shall not apply:
" (1) Section 72(n) (2) (relating to limitation of tax in case of
certain distributions with respect to contributions by self-em-
ployed individuals).
"(2) Section 170(b) (5) (relating to carryover of certain ex-
cess charitable contributions).
"(3) Section 632 (relating to sale of oil or gas properties).
"(4) Section 673 (b) (relating to exception where trust in-
come is payable to charitable beneficiaries).
" (5) Section 1111 (relating to distribution of stock pursuant
to order enforcing the antitrust laws).
"(6) Section 1201 (b) (relating to alternative tax on capital
gains).
"(7) Section 1347 (relating to claims against the United
States, etc.).
" (c) ADJUSTMENTS TO BASIS.-Notwithstanding any provision
of section 1016 (relating to adjustments to basis) and notwith.
standing any election made under this title, proper adjustment in
respect of property shall, under regulations prescribed by the
Secretary or his delegate, be made with respect to amounts de-
scribed in section 1393.
"(d) PENALTIES APPLIOABLE TO CERTAIN DISTRIBUTIONs.-Section
72(m) (5) (relating to penalties applicable to certain amounts re-
ceived by owner-employees) shall be applied as if this subchapter
had not been enacted.
"(e) TAXABLE INcoME.-With respect to any taxable year for
which an election under section 1391 is in effect, the term 'taxable
income' wherever used in this title shall be read as 'simplified
taxable income', unless the context otherwise requires.
"(f) CERTAIN TRUSTS.-With respect to any taxable year for
which an election under section 1391 is in effect-
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"(1) paragraphs (1), (2), (3), and (4) of section 665(b)
(relating to accumulation distributions of trusts, etc.) shall not
apply,
"(2) section 666(a) (relating to amount allocated in the case
of accumulation distribution) shall apply to the preceding tax-
able years of a trust described in section 666(a) without regard
to any provision of such section which would (but for this para-
graph) limit its application to the 5 preceding taxable years, and
"(3) the next to the last sentence of section 66S(a) (relating
to amounts treated as received in prior taxable years) shall not
apply.
"(g) INCOME AVERAGING.-
"(1) IN GENERAL.-The tax imposed by section 1302 shall, in
case of a taxpayer who so chooses, be limited to an amount de-
termined in accordance with the principles of part I (relating to
income averaging) of subchapter Q, provided that-
"(A) The income of a year for which an election under
section 1391 is in effect shall not be averaged with the income
of a year for which such an election is not in effect;
"(B) Notwithstanding section 1302(e)(2) (relating to the
the definition of base period), if an election under section 1391
is in effect for the computation year, the base period shall be
the immediatelypreceding taxable years (not in excess of four)
for which an election under section 1391 was in effect; and
" (C) The Secretary or his delegate shall prescribe such
regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out the pur-
poses of this section.
"(2) ELIGIBLE INDIVIDuALS.-For any taxable year for which
an election under section 1391 is in effect and for the four im-
mediately succeeding taxable years, a taxpayer shall not be an
eligible individual within the meaning of section 1303 (relating
to individuals eligible for income averaging) unless he consents,
at the time and in the manner prescribed by regulations, to the
regulations under paragraph (1) (C) of this subsection.
"(h) CRoss REFERENCE.- For extension of statute of limitations
in certain cases, see sections 6501(k) and 6511(d)(5)."
(b) CONTRIBUTIONS TO EMPLOY.EEs' TRUSTS, ETO.-
(1) IN GENERAL.-Part I of subchaper D of chapter 1 (relating
to pension, profit sharing, stock bonus plans, etc.) is amended by
adding after section 407 the following new section:
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SPEOIAL RULE RELATING TO OONTRIBUTIONS
FOR EMPLOYEES WHO HAVE ELEOTED SIM-
PLIFIED TAX METHOD.
" (a) IN GENERAL.-Notwithstanding any other provision of this
part, an employee shall include (under regulations prescribed by
the Secretary or his delegate) in his gross income for the taxable
year contributions which are-
" (1) described in sections 403 (b), 404(a), 404 (b), and 405 (c),
"(2) made on his behalf in any taxable year for which an
election made by him under section 1391 (relating to election
of simplified tax) is in effect, and
"(3) not previously included in his gross income, but only to
the extent that his rights to or derived from such contributions
become nonforfeitable during the taxable year. For purposes of
this section, the Secretary or his delegate may by regulations
prescribe that contingencies which are not substantial shall not
be taken into account in determining whether an employee's
rights are or become nonforfeitable during the taxable year.
" (b) CROSS REFERENCE.-
"For treatment of contributions nonforfeitable when made, see
section 1393(b) (5)."
(2) CLERICAL Al\IENDMENT.-The table of sections for part I
of subchapter D of chapter I is amended by adding at the end
thereof the following:
"Sec. 408. Special rule relating to contributions for employees who have
elected simplified tax method."
(c) CERTAIN STOCK OPTIONs.-Section 425 (relating to definitions
and special rules) is amended by redesignating subsection (j) as
subsection (k) and inserting after subsection (i) the following new
subsection:
(j) SPECIAL RULE FOR EMPLOYEES WHO HAVE ELECTED UNDER
SECTION 1391.-Section 421 (a) (1) shall not apply to any option
granted to the taxpayer during a taxable year for which an election
by him under section 1391 (relating to election of simplified tax)
is in effect."
(d) ACCUMULATING TRUSTS.-
(1) IN GENERAL.-Subpart E of part I of subchapter J of
chapter 1 (relating to grantors and others treated as substantial
owners) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following
new section:
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"SEC. 679. INDIVIDUAL ELECTING SIMPLIFIED TAX
METHOD TREATED AS SUBSTANTIAL
OWNER.
"(a) GENERAL RULE. -An individual for whom an election under
section 1391 (relating to election of simplified tax) is in effect
for the taxable year shall be treated as the owner of any portion
of a trust in respect of which, for such taxable year, there may
be accumulated any item of gross income or any item required to be
added to adjusted gross income under section 1393(b) (relating
to additions to adjusted gross income), if such accumulated item
may ultimately vest in such individual or his estate and must
ultimately vest in such individual, his estate, or his appointees.
"(b) SPECIAL RULEs.-For purposes of subsection (a)-
"(1) The term 'appointees' includes beneficiaries designated
in the trust instrument, legatees, persons appointed by will, and
persons who take in default of an appointment.
"(2) The Secretary or his delegate may provide by regula-
tions that contingencies which are not substantial shall not be
taken into account.
"(c) EXCEPTION WHERE GRANTOR OR PERSON OTHER THA...."i
GRANTOR Is TAXABLE.-Subsection (a) shall not apply if the grantor
of the trust is otherwise treated as the owner under section 671 to
677, inclusive, or if a person other than the grantor is otherwise
treated as the owner under section 678."
(2) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.-The table of sections for subpart
E of part I of subchapter J of chapter 1 is amended by adding
at the end thereof the following:
"Sec. 679. Individual electing simplified tax m('thod tr('at('c1 as substantial
owner."
(e) INCOME FROM AN EMPLOnmNT.-Paragraph (2) of section
232(g) (relating to income from employment) of the Revenue Act
of 1964 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new
sentence: "A taxpayer may not elect under this paragraph for any
taxable year for which an election by him under section 1391 (relat-
ing to election of simplified tax) is in effect."
(f) STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS EXTENDED.-
(1) LIMITATIONS ON ASsEss:r.mNT.-Section 6501 (relating to
limitations on assessment and collection) is amended by redesig-
nating subsection (k) as subsection (1) and by inserting after
subsection (j) the following new subsection:
"(k) TAXPAYERS ELECTING UNDER SECTION 1391.-In the case
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of a deficiency attributable to the application of regulations under
section 1394(a) (relating to regulations to prevent avoidance of
tax, etc.), such deficiency may be assessed at any time before the
expiration of the period within which a deficiency for the last tax-
able year for which the election by the taxpayer under section 1391
(relating to election of simplified tax) is in effect may be assessed."
(2) LIMITATIONS ON CREDIT OR REFUND.-Section 6511(d) (re-
lating to special rules applicable to income taxes) is amended
by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraph:
" (5) SPECIAL PERIOD OF LIMITATIONS WITH RESPECT TO TA."{PAYERS
ELECTING UNDER SECTION 1391.-If the claim for credit or refund
relates to an overpayment attributable to the application of
regulations under section 1394(a) (relating to regulations to
prevent avoidance of tax), in lieu of the 3-year period of limita-
tions prescribed in subsection (a), the period shall be that period
which ends with the expiration of the 15th day of the 40th month
following the end of last taxable year for which the election by the
taxpayer under section 1391 (relating to election of simplified
tax) is in effect."
(g) NONSEPARABILITY OF PROVISIONS.-Notwithstanding section
7852(a) (relating to separability clause), if any provision of the
amendments made by this section, or the application thereof to
any person or circumstance, is held invalid on constitutional
grounds by the Supreme Court of the United States, the amend-
ments made by this section shall have no force or effect, and the
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 shall apply as if
this section had not been enacted.
(h) TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS.-
(1) The table of subchapters for chapter 1 is amended by
adding at the end thereof the following:
"SUBCHAPTER U. Election of Simplified Tax Method."
(2) Section 891 (relating to doubling of rates of tax on citizens
and corporations of certain foreign countries) is amended by
striking out"and 881" and inserting in lieu thereof "881, and
1392".
"SEC. 3. INCREASE OF LIMITATION ON STANDARD DE-
DUCTION.
The second sentence of section 141(a) (relating to standard
deduction) is amended to read as follows: "The standard deduc-
tion shall not exceed $2,000, except that in the case of a separate
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return by a married individual the standard deduction shall not
exceed $1,000."
"SEC. 4. MINIMUM STANDARD DEDUCTION.
Paragraph (2) of section 141(c) (relating to minimum standard
deduction) is amended to read as follows:
"(2) (A) $300, in the case of a joint return of a husband and
wife under section 6013,
"(B) $300, in the case of a return of an individual who is
not married, or
" (C) $150, in the case of a separate return by a married
. di 'a al"ill VI n .
"SEC. 5. EFFECTIVE DATE.
The amendments made by this Act shall apply to taxable years
beginning after December 31, 1964."
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